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CAN LAW AND ECONOMICS BE BOTH PRACTICAL AND 
PRINCIPLED? 
David A. HofSman* 
Michael P. 0 'Shes** 
'Be it my will that my justice be ruled by my mercy.' That is a 
prayer which we all need to utter at times when the demon of 
formalism tempts the intellect with the lure of scientific order.' 
I. PRINCIPLED AND PRACTICAL COMMITMENTS IN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 
A. Moral and Practical Normative Questions 
I .  Identifying the Commitments That Underlie a 
Position in Law and Economics 
2. Criticism of the Ideal of Completeness 
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1. W. Kip Viscusi and the Anti- Utilitarian Jury 
2. Cass Sunstein, and the Anti-Utilitarian Law 
Students 
3. W. Kip Viscusi Returns with Yet More Bad 
News 
4. Jonathan Baron, and the Need for Education 
E. The Possible Scope of Anti-Utilitarian and Other Law- 
Related Preferences 
III. CAN A PREFERENCE-BASED LEGAL POLICY CO-EXIST WITH 
DEMOCRACY? 
A. Problems Confronting Normative Law and Economics 
1. Developing Improved Practical Techniques to 
Measure Welfare 
2. Law-Related Preferences as Components of 
Welfare 
3. Law-Related Preferences as Influences on the 
Behavior of Legal Actors 
B. Hiding the Ball: Secrecy as a Response to Law-Related 
Preferences 
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Utilitarian Preferences 
E. Limiting the Scope of Law and Economics Based Re- 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The law and economics2 movement today is in a vigorous ferment. 
In recent years, law and economics scholars have started to explore 
both the psychological and philosophical foundations of their discipline 
2. In this Article. "law and economics" means normative law and economics. Normative 
law and economics "recommend[s] changes that might improve" the legal system. while positive 
law and economics simply "explains[s] the legal system as it is" by charting its economic effects. 
A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS xiv (2d ed. 1989). 
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with a new seriou~ness.~ Correspondingly, their proposals for reform- 
ing the legal system have begun to change. There is a sense afoot that 
adjusting the legal system to serve economic goals is more complicated 
than was previously appreciated and may require significant political or 
institutional changes. Some scholars respond to this development by 
scaling back their ambitions; they offer limited defenses of the current 
uses of economic techniques by government actors such as regulatory 
agencies. Others, however, still hope to extend the domain of econom- 
ics into the common law. These more ambitious scholars are increas- 
ingly forced to consider policies of paternalism. 
Consider the following proposals, all discussed by economically 
minded scholars within the past four years: 
An economist, reacting to experimental data showing that citi- 
zens (especially racial minorities) refuse to obey efficient rules 
for setting punitive damages in tort, concludes that this data 
supports proposals to entrust punitive damages to judges or to 
eliminate them entirely in some cases.4 
A prominent, moderate legal theorist mulls the idea of removing 
the tort system from the hands of citizens by transferring judi- 
cial and legislative power to unelected bureaucrats, reasoning 
that such bureaucrats could be trusted to further the economic 
goal of optimal deterrence "whatever ordinary people think. "' 
A psychologist, reacting to evidence of a popular distaste for 
utilitarianism, encourages parents to buy their children world- 
simulating computer games to overcome mental barriers to con- 
sequentialist thinking and encourages elementary schoolteachers 
to alter their curricula in order to teach pupils the moral pre- 
cepts of ~tilitarianism.~ 
Two Harvard law professors reason that "political actors" like 
judges, in response to "citizens' limited capacities" to compre- 
hend economic analysis, may need to hide the true bases of 
their decisions by couching their public statements in a "lan- 
3. The current debate about foundations has produced book-length contributions. See COST- 
BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Matthew D. Adler 
& Eric A. Posner eds., 2001) [hereinafter COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS]; Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001); BEHAVIORAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
4. See W .  Kip Viscusi. The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 313, 342-44 (2001); see also infra Parts II.D.1, II.D.3. 
5. See Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want Optimal 
Deterrence? 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 250 (2000); see also infra Part II.D.2. 
6 .  See JONATHAN BARON, JUDGMENT MISGUIDED: INTUITION AND ERROR IN PUBLIC 
DECISION MAKING 201 (1998); see also infra Parts II.D.4, 1II.C. 
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guage of fairness. "' 
These proposals reflect an important tension that affects law and 
economics today. The tension occurs as analysts try to reconcile the 
techniques of economics with an improving understanding of how peo- 
ple behave and of what they want from their legal system. The purpose 
of this Article is to describe this tension; to point out recent psycho- 
logical evidence that sharpens it; and then to consider some prospects 
for resolving the tension, whether by paternalism or by other means. 
In Part I, we identify a source of the tension-the current efforts to 
supply a plausible moral foundation for law and economics. After ex- 
plaining the basic concepts used in economic analysis, we examine past 
attempts to provide a principled justification for using economics to 
reform the legal system. We suggest that these attempts largely failed, 
so that legal economists have generally proceeded without a well- 
articulated moral basis. Recently, however, scholars have begun serious 
efforts to pay off this overdue debt. In accord with several recent au- 
thors, we conclude that a good justification of law and economics must 
pass a two-part test; it must be both morally principled and feasible to 
apply in practice. 
In Part 11, we seek to add something to the debate by presenting 
empirical evidence that this test may be harder to meet than scholars 
have recognized. We outline psychological research suggesting that 
normal citizens may have law-related preferences-preferences about 
the content and fairness of their legal system. While law-related prefer- 
ences are tough to measure in traditional market terms, we think the 
evidence for them is too strong to be simply ignored by economists, 
especially since they are likely to influence the behavior of jurors, liti- 
gants, and voters. Most intriguingly, the studies suggest that in certain 
cases people prefer that legal decisions not be made on an economic 
basis. 
In Part 111, we offer predictions about the further development of 
law and economics in light of the discipline's growing theoretical so- 
phistication and the evidence of law-related preferences. The most 
compelling options are: (1) various forms of paternalism, whether by 
excluding citizens from participation in the legal system or by discount- 
ing some types of individual preferences from consideration in choosing 
policies, and (2) a limited implementation of economic techniques, ap- 
plying them strongly in some areas of the law and not others. We also 
discuss ways in which paternalistic approaches may be counterproduc- 
tive. We conclude by giving our answer to the question that both titles 
7. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1319. 
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and motivates the Article. 
I. PRINCIPLED AND PRACTICAL COMMITMENTS IN LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 
Most lawyers and law students are familiar with some of the policy 
recommendations made by different legal economists. Different schol- 
ars have argued that strict product liability should be replaced with a 
negligence rule;' that, to the contrary, product manufacturers should be 
subjected to a more pro-plaintiff standard of "enterprise l iabi l i t~;"~ that 
the punishment for a given crime should be made stiffer as the likeli- 
hood decreases that violators will be caught;'' and that corporate man- 
agers should sometimes be permitted to engage in insider trading of 
their own corporation's stock." 
Scholars coinrnonly justify these changes in the law on the grounds 
that they would increase "social wealth" or "social welfare." But these 
are technical concepts borrowed from the discipline of economics. 
There has rarely been explicit discussion of how this jargon relates to 
appealing moral foundations. For example, do legal rules that increase 
"social wealth" thereby promote interests that Americans value? Con- 
versely, when analysts do lay out their moral assumptions, it is often 
unclear how a judge or bureaucrat who is sympathetic to economic aims 
can put them into practice. How can a legal decision-maker with limited 
resources confidently maximize "social welfare" on a case-by-case ba- 
sis? 
Our aim in this part is to suggest what good answers to these ques- 
tions should be like. As one touchstone, we will use the recent work of 
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell. Their important new article, Fair- 
ness Versus W e l f a r e ,  defends a vision of law and economics that is 
founded on the moral assumptions of welfare economics, a field whose 
insights, Kaplow and Shavell claim, have not been fully incorporated 
into previous s~holarship. '~ Kaplow and Shavell argue that economists 
should take account of all individual preferences about the legal system 
8. See GARY T. SCHWARTZ. THE VITALITY OF NEGLIGENCE AND THE ETHICS OF STRICT 
LIABILITY (1981). 
9. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case For 
Enterprise Liability. 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 787 (1993). 
10. See George J. Stigler, The Optimrun Enforcement of Law, in ESSAYS I N  THE ECONOMICS 
OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 55, 56 (Gary S. Becker et al. eds., 1974) (arguing that significant 
increases in sanctions would lead to greater deterrence). 
11. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 253-75 (1991) (offering economic critique of the restrictions on insider trading 
imposed by federal securities laws). 
12. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3. at 967-76. 
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and its objects, regardless of the content of those preferences.13 Like a 
taste for "art, nature, or fine wine," Kaplow and Shave11 argue, moral 
beliefs about the legal system should influence the policy choices made 
by legal analysts and decision-makers.14 Our second touchstone is re- 
cent work by Matthew Adler and Eric Posner. Adler and Posner have, 
to date, made the most sophisticated attempt to connect common eco- 
nomic techniques to plausible moral principles." 
In Part I.A, we introduce a conceptual framework that distinguishes 
the moral component of a position in law and economics from the pro- 
cedures that must be used to implement it. In Part I.B, we discuss the 
different moral principles that have been put forward as possible justifi- 
cations for law and economics reform. This discussion concludes by 
presenting the leading moral positions in contention today: Kaplow's 
and Shavellys view that preferences should be satisfied regardless of 
their content, and the view of other analysts that only some preferences 
are morally relevant. 
Next, in Part I.C, we explain the economic procedure of cost- 
benefit analysis, which has been the default technique used by scholars 
to choose among competing legal rules. We then describe the ways that 
recent scholarship in behavioral psychology has undermined many of 
the assumptions of traditional cost-benefit analysis. In Part I.D, we 
survey (and criticize) current attempts to develop improved procedures 
that incorporate better information about individual well-being than 
traditional cost-benefit analysis. Finally, Part 1.E sets out problems that 
can arise when the moral positions favored by current analysts are 
combined with practical positions committed to using information be- 
sides market prices to measure preferences. 
A. Moral and Practical Normative Questions 
I .  Identiaing the Commitments That Underlie a Position in Law 
and Economics 
Normative economic analysis presupposes a norm. However, the 
norms employed in economic analysis need not necessarily coincide 
with the moral norms endorsed by a correct philosophical theory. One 
may reasonably seek to identify and implement legal practices that 
maximize a certain attribute without treating that attribute as an ade- 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When 
Preferences Are Distorted [hereinafter Implementing Cost-Benefit], in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS. 
supra note 3. at 269-309; see also Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner. Rethinking Cost-Benefit 
Analysis. 109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999) [hereinafter Rethinking Cost-Benefit]. 
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quate philosophical criterion of the value of social arrangements. Thus, 
one might pursue a legal system that maximizes a particular attribute 
(call it a subgoal) because the subgoal seems to be a good proxy, a 
"second best" alternative, for one's real, ultimate norm (call it the 
goal). Or it may be best to shoot for the subgoal in practice if either the 
goal is difficult to measure directly, or if the goal is more politically 
controversial than the subgoal. Or a scholar may choose to present a 
model or formal analysis in terms of a subgoal simply because it is eas- 
ier to understand than an analysis in terms of the goal. Finally, a par- 
ticular subgoal might be a good proxy for a number of different goals, 
so that people with different fundamental beliefs could still agree on the 
value of analysis that promotes that subgoal. 
Recent law and economics scholarship is conscious of these distinc- 
tions. Professors Adler and Posner justify choosing regulations using 
the economic technique of cost-benefit analysis on the ground that cost- 
benefit analysis is a "decision procedure" that "says nothing at all [di- 
rectly] about the moral worth of the project," but tends to promote 
morally good principles on the whole.16 Lewis Kornhauser concurs that 
"it is inappropriate to consider cost-benefit analysis as a moral crite- 
rion;" instead, its moral apologists must "consider how cost-benefit 
analysis functions within [a] wider institutional framework" of govern- 
ment action.17 It need not be "justifiable in is~lation."'~ Kaplow and 
Shavell, who address normative issues at a more abstract level, claim 
that analysis of policies based on their effects on the norm of wealth 
can be morally valuable, even though "wealth is not in itself deemed to 
be valuable. "Ig 
A consistent terminology for these distinctions may be helpful. We 
will therefore propose a pair of terms that can be used to keep track of 
the different aspects of a legal economist's normative commitments. A 
complete proposal to reform the legal system on economic grounds 
would answer two questions. First, what substantive ethical or moral 
criteria should ultimately be used to evaluate the success or failure of 
the legal system? We will call this the moral question. Second, what 
type of economic decision procedure should be used in practice to iden- 
tify legal rules that satisfy the relevant moral criteria? We will call this 
the practical question. 
Though separable, the two questions are obviously connected. The 
analyst cannot answer the practical question-cannot choose a method, 
16. Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 194-95. 
17. Lewis A. Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS. 
supra note 3, at 217. 
18. Id. at 218. 
19. Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 3. at 997. 
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a decision procedure-without having some idea of what ultimate crite- 
ria the chosen procedure ought to serve. Conversely, a moral goal that 
the analyst cannot connect to some sort of implementing procedure in 
the real world would be a doubtful guide for legal reform. 
A legal analyst could select and defend a variety of moral princi- 
ples. She might maintain that the legal system should foster efficiency 
or equality; fairness, wealth, or individual well-being; piety or revolu- 
tion. The range of available answers to the moral question, we suppose, 
is chiefly constrained by the analyst's moral intuitions and those of the 
community.20 
An analyst answers the practical question by deciding to use a par- 
ticular decision procedure (or type of procedure) to pick and choose 
between different policies, such as competing legal rules. Notice that 
this choice itself involves the adoption of a standard-economic analy- 
sis, by its nature, must compare the relative quantities of some attribute 
present in different outcomes, so different decision procedures are 
characterized in part by the different data they empha~ize.~' Various 
candidates for this attribute include the satisfaction of preferences 
measured by willingness to pay as inferred from market  transaction^,^^ 
the satisfaction of preferences revealed in choice-making behavior gen- 
erally," and perhaps even psychological experiences of pleasure, if 
only they could be measured directly.24 The attribute that guides the 
decision procedure may be treated as a mere subgoal, a proxy for the 
moral good, or it may be treated as a goal. For example, while choos- 
ing legal rules that maximize the satisfaction of preferences backed by 
willingness to pay might be sought for its own sake (the moral position 
20. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15 (5th ed. 1998) ("[Tlhe 
economist [cannot] tell us whether . . . consumer satisfaction should be the dominant value of 
society."); HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOM~CS 529 (2d ed. 1990); cf. Kaplow & 
Shavell, supra note 3, at 986 (acknowledging that "to adopt welfare economics is to adopt the 
moral position that one should be concerned, positively and exclusively, with individuals' well- 
being"). 
21. See Tyler Cowen, What a Non-Paretian Welfare Economics Would Have to Look Like, in 
ECONOMICS AND HERMENEUTICS 285. 286 (D. Lavoie ed. 1991). reprinted in ECONOMIC 
WELFARE (Tyler Cowen ed. 2000) (noting that welfare economic theory "is concerned with the 
ranking of outcomes and must therefore focus upon the maximization of some attribute or set of 
attributes"); &IT K. DASGUPTA & D.W. PEARCE, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 21 (1972) ("The decision-maker . . . is assumed to have an objective function, an 
entity which he aims to maximize. This objective function may be profits, or  income, or net 
social benefits defined in a way so as to incorporate things other than income."). 
22. See, e.g., Richard Posner. Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 103 (1979); see also Richard Posner. Wealth Marimization Revisited. 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 85 (1985) (offering a qualified defense of applying the wealth- 
maximization norm in policy choices). 
23. See infra notes 160-193 and accompanying text. 
24. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 34, 38 (1982) (arguing for reform of penal statutes to promote the norm of maxi- 
mizing experienced pleasure and minimizing pain). 
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of wealth maximization), it might also be sought as a proxy for increas- 
ing everyone's well-being. 
The above, we said, is a sketch of a complete position. However, 
much work in law and economics presents policy conclusions without 
giving fully-fledged answers to the moral and practical questions. For 
example, A. Mitchell Polinsky's popular primer An Introduction to Law 
and Economics presents economic models of legal rules in a simple, 
non-algebraic form that measures "all benefits and costs . . . in terms 
of a common denominator-dollars."25 Polinsky then trades off these 
hypothetical dollar-denominated costs and benefits to determine the rule 
that maximizes the amount of net gains to society. He "emphasize[s] 
that this assumption [that costs are monetized] is made for expositional 
~implicity."'~ Thus Polinsky's primer presents a set of models that cor- 
respond most naturally to a particular answer to the practical question 
(the decision procedure of cost-benefit analysis, discussed at length 
below, which measures preferences by implication from market prices), 
but Polinsky takes no position on whether cost-benefit analysis is the 
best practical approach to choosing legal rules. 
Similarly, Polinsky addresses certain problems that may arise when 
a policymaker seeks to trade off the goals of efficiency and equity in 
the legal sy~tern.'~ But the primer does not try to resolve the question 
whether a concern for equity is morally required, nor does it suggest 
which distributions of income should be regarded as eq~itable.~' 
Polinsky refrains from selecting a moral aspiration, except to assert that 
efficiency is one value about which decision-makers should care. 
Polinsky's primer, with its open-ended approach to moral and prac- 
tical questions, is a fairly typical academic discussion of normative law 
and economics. In particular, the contributions of professional econo- 
mists to legal policy analysis tend to be incomplete in order to empha- 
size their generality. These analysts model different legal contexts and 
point out mathematical relationships that hold true among the different 
costs and benefits involved, regardless of how those costs and benefits 
are measured. The aim is to develop insights that are applicable regard- 
less of the moral and practical commitments held by decision-makers.29 
25. POLINSKY, supra note 2, at 10. 
26. Id. 
27. See id. at 7-10, 119-27 (defining "equityn as an attribute of the distribution of income in 
society, and recommending that equitable goals be accomplished through legislative tax and 
transfer programs, rather than through the design of legal rules). 
28. See id. 
29. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic 
Analysis. 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
ACCIDENT LAW 295-96 (1987) (inviting "readers [to] modify the [normative] conclusions reached 
here in light of the values they . . . attach to principles of fairness," but expressing no opinion 
about whether such modification would be normatively desirable or undesirable). Obviously. 
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Incompleteness in defense of generality is often no vice. 
But if law and economics is to create benefits through reform, then 
somebody must apply economic models to concrete situations. They 
must measure, compare, and make a decision. Even if proxies and es- 
timates are used to gauge costs and benefits for the community as a 
whole, there is a concrete question whether any given proxy is suffi- 
ciently accurate for a particular society at a particular time. Perhaps the 
job of concrete economic analysis will not fall to the judiciary. Perhaps 
judges should be asked simply to apply statutory legal rules that the 
legislature has previously found to be justified on economic grounds. 
Nevertheless, this option simply means that the legislature must decide 
what the relevant costs are, how to weigh them, and whether a given 
legal rule will produce benefits if enacted in a particular state at a par- 
ticular time. The freedom to adopt agnostic positions is not complete. 
Models presented in economic analysis are irrelevant unless it is con- 
ceivable that they could be applied, with some accuracy, by relevant 
actors like courts, legislatures, or government agencies in practical 
situations of policy choice. And conversely, the fact that models can be 
implemented is irrelevant unless we believe that their implementation 
would promote the principles that decision-makers perceive as impor- 
tant. 
2. Criticism of the Ideal of Completeness 
How much completeness, then, is necessary? That is, how much 
constraint does the requirement to be both principled and practical im- 
pose on law and economics? Cass Sunstein has argued influentially that 
common law judging is pervaded with "incompletely theorized agree- 
ments" about general principles, on one hand, and about the correct 
outcomes of individual cases, on the other.30 In Sunstein's view, the use 
of incomplete agreements is often indispensable as a matter of political 
reality.31 For example, Sunstein suggests that political actors who share 
an agreement on a general principle (such as the wrongfulness of racial 
discrimination), but differ on its application to particular facts (such as 
affirmative action), can still see themselves as holding important things 
in common despite painful disagreements about individual outcomes.32 
Similarly, the ability of actors, such as appellate judges, to agree on 
specific outcomes in particular cases, but not on the large abstract prin- 
ciples that justify them, enables the legal system to resolve disputes 
Kaplow and Shavell's Fairness Versus Welfare, supra note 3, exhibits no such agnosticism. 
30. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-61 (1996). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 35-36. 
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while minimizing political conflict.33 
Recently, Sunstein has tried to extend this reasoning to law and 
economics. In his view, it may be justified in some cases to use eco- 
nomic decision procedures such as cost-benefit analysis to choose gov- 
ernment regulations, despite the lack of a moral consensus on the desir- 
ability of the procedure.34 Thus, he argues, "it should be possible for 
diverse people to agree on presumptive floors and ceilings [of monetary 
costs] for regulatory expenditures," even if those people doubt "that all 
questions of regulatory policy should be resolved by asking how much 
people are willing to pay for various social goods."35 
Sunstein's contentions have merit. However, Sunstein also admits 
that the possibility of incomplete agreement has its limits.36 In our 
view, there are several reasons that we should hesitate to accept highly 
incomplete justifications for legal reforms based on law and economics. 
First, Sunstein defends a very open-ended style of decision-making 
that he calls "cost-benefit analy~is."~' As he notes, it differs from the 
more rigid form of "cost-benefit analysis" that is commonly taught- 
standard cost-benefit analysis does resolve policy questions by asking 
how much people are willing to pay.38 
But to the extent that the procedure used for policy choice is highly 
malleable and flexible, it also becomes less distinctive and less of a 
guide. If our methods of economic analysis are allowed to become very 
loose-textured in order to secure incomplete consensus, there is a dan- 
ger that law and economics will simply reduce to a rhetoric for carrying 
on policy discussions. 
On the other hand, suppose we are considering an economic deci- 
sion procedure that is fairly determinate, setting boundaries as to what 
data will be measured and how they will be compared. In that case, we 
may be hesitant to accept an incomplete justification because the future 
implications of accepting the procedure will be great. Sunstein is con- 
vincing when he discusses the value of incomplete agreements in secur- 
ing consensus on abstract principles of justice, on one hand, and out- 
comes in particular legal cases, on the other.39 But one can accept a 
vague principle without being bound to any particular future application 
of it, and one can accept the result in one case without being bound to 
33. See id. at 39. 41 (stating that incompletely theorized agreements about outcomes "help 
make law possible; they even help make life possible"). 
34. Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS. 
supra note 3, at 223, 256. 
35. Id. at 256. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. See infra discussion Part I.C.1. 
39. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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the same result in a slightly different case. However, to the extent the 
procedure for an economic decision is determinate enough to be useful, 
it will presumably leave future outcomes much less open to maneuver- 
ing than either of Sunstein's examples. Political actors should therefore 
be leery about adopting such procedures without inspecting their moral 
credentials. 
Finally, Sunstein's notion of incompletely theorized agreement is 
most persuasive when applied to a situation in which one group of citi- 
zens supports an economic procedure because it has been plausibly jus- 
tified in terms of moral norm A, which they accept; while another 
group rejects moral norm A, but supports the procedure because it has 
been plausibly justified in terms of moral norm B, which the second 
group accepts. This presumes that some plausible moral arguments are 
forthcoming. In a situation where no plausible moral case had been 
made for a given procedure, an incompletely theorized agreement that 
the procedure is valuable should be much less likely, and perhaps less 
admirable. 
These considerations suggest that a position with a fair amount of 
theoretical "completeness" on the moral and practical levels is still de- 
sirable in law and economics. The following parts of this Article con- 
sider some of the intellectual resources currently available to theorists 
who want to meet that goal. We begin with the moral question. 
B. Past and Present Moral Positions in Law and Economics 
I .  Wealth Maximization and its Critics 
Before the current ferment, legal economists last gave the moral 
question serious attention during a period of scholarly debate between 
1979 and 1981.40 The high-water mark in that debate was the 1980 Hof- 
stra Law Review symposium on EfSiciency as a Legal C~ncern.~'  That 
symposium's all-star participants included Guido Calabresi, Richard 
Posner, Ronald Dworkin, Duncan Kennedy, and Frank Michelman, 
among others. 
The Hofstra symposium focused on a thesis that Richard Posner had 
first expressed in an article published the previous year.42 Posner ar- 
gued that "the economic norm [ofJ 'wealth maximization' provides a 
-- - -- - 
40. See Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 3. at 996 (describing Richard Posner's work from 
1979 to 1981 as "the most sustained attempt by a legal scholar to defend a normative law and 
economics approach"). 
41. Symposium, Eflciency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980). 
42. Posner, Ufilirarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, supra note 22, at 103; cf. id. at 
111 (summarizing claim that "the economic approach is less 'rejectable' than utilitarianism or 
Kantianism"). 
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firmer basis for a normative theory of law than does utilitarianism" or 
autonomy-based ethical theories (which Posner termed "Kantiani~m").~~ 
He attempted to provide a principled ethical argument for wealth 
maximization; he was not simply arguing that wealth-maximizing pro- 
cedures were proxies for a separate moral end. 
Posner's argument had two prongs. First, he argued that "wealth 
maximization, especially in the common law setting, derives support 
from [a] principle of consent that can also be regarded as underlying 
the . . . quite different approach of Pareto ethics."44 Posner's consent 
argument drew on the notion of "ex ante compensation," which still 
enjoys some currency among welfare economists. Posner reasoned that, 
while individual outcomes of policy choices that maximized wealth 
alone could be viewed as unacceptable to the losers, the outcomes 
would still be worthy of hypothetical consent if the individual could 
expect to enjoy net benefits from a series of such choices.45 In the long 
run, if he would expect to "win" at least as much as he would "lose" 
from choices under such a criterion, then the criterion could be treated 
as enjoying unanimous (hypothetical) consent.46 Posner compared the 
hypothetical consent that he thought legitimated applying the wealth 
maximization norm to society to the consent (to a risk of losing) that a 
purchaser of a lottery ticket gives by choosing to make that p~rchase.~'  
At the same time, Posner argued that wealth maximization avoided 
the more extreme or "fanatical" implications that would follow from 
basing the legal system on a purely consent-based, "Kantian" substan- 
tive norm.48 Because wealth maximization "assign[s] substantial weight 
to preferences," it was said to resemble utilitarianism in connecting 
ethical worth to the production of human happiness.49 But by counting 
preferences only to the extent that they were registered (or could be 
registered) in voluntary transactions, wealth maximization also avoided 
some of the unattractive implications of theoretical utilitariani~rn.~~ 
Professors Ronald Dworkin and Jules Coleman trenchantly criti- 
cized Posner's ethical arguments for wealth maximization in their con- 
tributions to the Hofstra symp~sium.~'  Dworkin's critique of the wealth 
43. Id. 
44. Richard Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Eficiency Norm in Conunon Law 
Adjudication. 8 HoFsTRA L. REV. 487. 488 (1980). 
45. Id. at 491-92. 
46. Id. at 492-93 & n.15. 
47. Id. at 492. 
48. Id. at 491-97. 
49. Posner, supra note 44. 
50. See id. at 497 (describing wealth maximization as "constrained utilitarianism," but as 
involving a constraint that "is not ad hoc but is supplied by the principle of consent," whose 
purpose is to "minimize coercion"). 
51. Eficiency as a Legal Concern. supra note 41. 
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norm was also developed in the contemporaneous article Is Wealth a 
Value?52 
Dworkin rejected both what he called the "immodest version" of 
Posner's normative thesis (the claim that increasing wealth should be 
the exclusive criterion of ethical value), and its "modest version" (the 
claim that increasing wealth was one component of ethical value).53 
Dworkin focused attention on the hypothetical example of a simple, 
involuntary transfer of a good from one individual, A, to another indi- 
vidual, B, whose willingness to pay for that good, measured in dollars, 
is somewhat greater than A's. Dworkin's point was that such a transac- 
tion, once it is analytically stripped of all non-wealth-related ethical 
characteristics (such as consent between the parties, or a net increase in 
personal happiness), is ethically inert-"no gain at A wealth 
gain, considered strictly as such, is simply irrelevant to any ethical cri- 
terion worth valuing. Dworkin suggested that whatever intuitive plausi- 
bility the wealth maximization norm enjoyed was derived from the fact 
that wealth-maximizing transfers are sometimes correlated with in- 
creases in personal happiness or ~ e l l - b e i n g . ~ ~  The impulse underlying 
the wealth norm was a half-glimpsed utilitarianism. 
Dworkin reached a similar conclusion in his Hofstra symposium 
piece, which focused on Posner's consent-based argument for wealth 
ma~imiza t ion .~~ First, Dworkin argued that the only type of consent that 
could be invoked to justify the wealth norm was hypothetical, or "coun- 
terfactual" consent.57 But because such counterfactual consent was not 
actual consent, Dworkin stressed, it was "itself irrelevant to political 
ju~tification."~~ Since legal rules help to fix entitlements, the adoption 
of a new rule frequently shifts wealth from some persons to others. 
Thus, in a typical situation of policy choice between different legal 
rules, many of the affected individuals would reasonably conclude that 
they will be losers from the adoption of a particular legal rule, and not 
just in the Short term, but consistently so.'' Actual consent to a given 
rule will typically not be forthcoming from a fraction of the popula- 
tion-perhaps from a majority. Dworkin's point was simply that one 
cannot justify a principle or procedure on the grounds that it is the 
52. Ronald M. Dworkin. Is Wealth a Value?. 9 J .  LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980). 
53. Id. at 201. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 200. 
56. Ronald Dworkin. Why Eficiency? A Response to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980). 
57. Id. at 574-75. 
58. Id. at 575. 
59. Consider oligopolists faced with a proposed strengthening of the prohibitions of the 
Sherman Act, or polluters faced with a proposed lowering of the legal standard of proof needed 
to establish that their polluting activities are enjoinable nuisances. 
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product of free choice, if the principle is not, in fact, chosea6' He con- 
cluded that "Posner's appeal to autonomy . . . is wholly spuri~us."~' 
Furthermore, Dworkin continued, to the extent Posner suggested 
that the losers from a wealth-maximizing rule should be viewed as con- 
senting to the rule, he could only support that claim on the grounds that 
the net social gains from such rules would outweigh social losses.62 In 
short, analysis of "consent" justifications for wealth maximization left 
one in the same place as did considering the wealth norm on its own 
merits. What Posner offered was "not an improved version of a Rawl- 
sian argument, but a utilitarian argument only. "63 
What was the upshot of the 1979-1981 debate over first principles? 
In hindsight, it appears that the foundational position presented by Pos- 
ner was significantly discredited. After 1980, it was increasingly diffi- 
cult to defend wealth maximization as an answer to the moral ques- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Within a few years of the 1980 exchange, Judge Posner himself be- 
gan to describe his allegiance to the wealth maximization norm in in- 
creasingly instrumental terms. By the time his 1985 essay Wealth 
Maximization Revisited was published, Posner had reached a revised 
p~sition.~' Posner acknowledged that he was "slightly more sympa- 
thetic" than he had previously been to criticisms of wealth maximiza- 
tion as an ethical prin~iple.'~ He also acknowledged that it was "not a 
demonstrably or a universally correct ethic. Indeed, he devoted part 
of his essay to discussing "the instrumental character of wealth maxi- 
mization. "68 There, he explicitly linked the appeal of wealth maximiza- 
60. Dworkin, supra note 56, at 574-79. 
61. Id. at 575. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 579. Jules Coleman's essay for the Hofstra symposium presented similar argu- 
ments against the principled use of wealth maximization. See Jules Coleman, Elficiency. Utility, 
and Wealth Marimization. 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 521-23 (1980). Coleman argued, first, that 
compensation (whether ex post or ex ante, in the form of risk discounting) is not equivalent to 
consent, and that "knowledge of a risk does not always amount to either explicit or  implicit 
waiver of a right or . . . an assumption of risk." Id. at 536-37 $1.45. Moreover, Coleman argued. 
Posner could not provide persuasive grounds to believe that economically rational individuals 
under uncertainty would choose to pursue wealth-maximizing institutions and legal rules with 
anything like the degree of unanimity required to give such 'hypothetical consent' legitimacy. Id. 
at 539-40. 
64. See, e.g.. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3; Lewis Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost- 
Benefit Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 201, 217 n.41 (discussing "Rich- 
ard Posner's proposal in the late seventies that common-law judges ought to maximize wealth." 
which "in effect proposed a cost-benefit criterion for judicial decision and . . . attempted to 
justify [it] . . . on general moral grounds," and concluding that Posner's attempted "justification 
largely failed"). 
65. Posner, Wealth Marimization Revisited, supra note 22. 
66. Id. at 85. 
67. Id. at 90. 
68. Id. at 95-100. 
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tion to its instrumental tendency to produce happiness: 
It is curious, but true, that to aim directly at maximizing happi- 
ness [through redistribution] . . . is self-defeating because it re- 
sults in a poor and unhappy society. Wealth maximization is a 
more effective instrument for attaining the goals of utilitarian- 
ism than utilitarianism itself. Stated otherwise, wealth maximi- 
zation is the correct rule of decision in a system of rule utilitari- 
a n i ~ m . ~ ~  
Thus, Posner's position since the mid-1980s on the normative ques- 
tions has not been sharply different from a "liberal" position such as 
that found in the early works of Guido Calabresi. Both Posner and the 
"early Calabresi" held that cost-benefit analysis of legal rules has in- 
strumental value (i.e., it is a decent answer to the practical question), 
and that principles such as autonomy and fairness can also come into 
play, functioning as a sort of ad  hoc veto on the results of cost-benefit 
analysis that can be used to align those results more closely with moral 
 riter ria.^' Works like Economic Analysis of law7' and The Costs of Ac- 
cidents* thus differ not in their basic moral and practical orientations, 
but in the details of their conclusions about the economic effects of par- 
ticular legal rules, and their intuitions about how frequently moral or 
ethical concerns should trump the results of cost-benefit analysis. 
Today Posner describes his moral position as corresponding to "the 
kind of vague utilitarianism, or 'soft core' classical liberalism, that one 
associates with John Stuart Posner's utilitarianism is qualified 
by concessions to individual liberty in cases where strict utilitarian or 
other consequentialist reasoning would produce what Posner views as 
repugnant conclusions.74 
Posner's sustained attention to philosophical foundations (and the 
absence thereof) has been the exception. Scholarship in law and eco- 
nomics after 1980 typically did not devote much energy to investigating 
moral foundations. There remained a wide scope for arguments that 
using cost-benefit analysis to choose legal practices was instrumentally 
related to maximizing individual utility, or promoting autonomy, or 
69. Id. at 98. Posner also argued that wealth maximization tended instrumentally to promote 
norms of autonomy that he assumed were a component of ethical value. Posner, Wealth Maximi- 
zation Revisited. supra note 22. at 99-102. 
70. Compare POSNER, supra note 20, at 13-15, 238, 284-287, with GUIDO CALABRESI, THE 
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 291 (1970) ("None of my criticisms of the fault system, based as they are 
on its failure to reduce accident costs adequately, would be decisive if the fault system found 
substantial support in our notions of justice."). 
71. RICHARD A. POSNER. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998). 
72. GUIDO CALABRESI. THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
73. RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY xii (1999). 
74. See POSNER. supra note 20. 
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whatever other norms were deemed to constitute a satisfactory answer 
to the moral question. But there were few attempts to justify law and 
economics in a rigorous way at its moral source. 
That is changing. In recent years, authors have become more con- 
scious of the moral and practical questions, and of the need for argu- 
ments to connect them. They present foundational moral principles that 
economic procedures are supposed to serve, and they give arguments 
defending their chosen principles over alternatives. All of the recent 
authors agree that a crucial moral criterion for analyzing legal policies 
is individual ~ e l l - b e i n g . ~ ~  But they propose differing conceptions of 
well-being. Kaplow and Shavell, whose approach we will describe as 
"comprehensive," believe that the moral goal of well-being reduces 
simply to giving people (as a whole) what they actually prefer. Other 
authors, whose approach we will describe as "restricted," think that the 
content of well-being is more circumscribed: some kinds of preferences 
that people hold should not be allowed to influence our conception of a 
good legal system. 
2. Well-Being: A Comprehensive Approach 
The legal system envisioned by Fairness Versus Welfare, based ex- 
clusively on well-being, will undoubtedly be one of the most widely 
discussed of the new foundational arguments. Indeed, Kaplow and 
Shavell's article is arguably the most extensive presentation of a princi- 
pled moral position that the law and economics tradition has ever of- 
fered. The broad outlines of their position are clear: "[Llegal rules 
should be selected entirely with respect to their effects [on human wel- 
fare, which is to say] on the well-being of individuals in society."76 
Decision-makers should not give any independent weight to "notions of 
fairness" such as retributive justice, individual liberty rights, or the 
view that keeping promises is intrinsically good; those values "are not 
based exclusively . . . on how legal policies affect individuals' well- 
beingmn In short, their answer to the moral question is that the legal 
system should take its moral direction entirely from what "economists 
refer to as welfare economics. "78 
Kaplow and Shavell expressly agree with the chief point of the post- 
1980 consensus-that wealth maximization is not a satisfactory answer 
-- p- - -- 
75. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3; see also Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 
15; Implementing Cost-Benefit, supra note 15 (articulating implications of their earlier work); 
Howard Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 
110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000). 
76. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 967. 
77. Id. at 1000. 
78. Id. at 968. 
20021 Law and Economics 353 
to the moral question.79 The two authors reject wealth as an "appropri- 
ate social goal," noting that "wealth is not defined in terms of individu- 
als' well-being."'' They assert that a moral answer must consider the 
distribution of income while defining well-being, which wealth maximi- 
zation does not do." 
The most distinctive aspect of Kaplow and Shavell's moral position 
is its commitment to utilitarianism based on unrestricted preferences. 
As they define it, welfare is founded upon the notion of individual pref- 
erences: "[Tlhe primitive element for analysis of an individual's well- 
being is that individual's ordering of possible  outcome^."^^ Outcomes 
are placed in a numerical order that reflects whether "one outcome is 
preferred to another. "83 Kaplow and Shavell adopt a generally inclusive 
attitude toward preferences, but hesitate to accept preferences that are 
difficult to measure by standard methods, or seem to diverge from the 
welfare implications of the rest of the preference-holder's  preference^.^^ 
The authors state that "[tlhe notion of well-being used in welfare eco- 
nomics is comprehensive in nature. It incorporates in a positive way 
everything that an individual might value," including goods, services, 
social realities, principles, feelings, and more." They refuse to exclude 
any classes of preference from the definition of well-being because of 
objections to the content of those  preference^.'^ Instead, "[ulnder a wel- 
fare economic analysis, any actual preference is given weight because it 
reflects an individual's actual well-being."87 In particular, Kaplow and 
Shavell refuse to exclude classes of preferences such as "other- 
regarding" preferences or malevolent preferences." They note that to 
draw distinctions between good and bad preferences implies that it is 
proper to apply criteria that go beyond the satisfaction of actually held 
 preference^.'^ Kaplow and Shavell's rejection of the use of independent 
notions of fairness also implies rejecting the validity of such criteria." 
79. See supra notes 40-72 and accompanying text. 
80. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 997. 
81. See id. at 989-92. 
82. Id. at 979 n.33. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 1339-50 (discussing objectionable preferences). 
85. Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 3. at 980. Indeed, Kaplow and Shavell stress that "[tlhe 
only limit on what is included in well-being is to be found in the minds of individuals them- 
selves. not in the minds of analysts." Id. 
86. See id. at 1346. 
87. Id. 
88. See id. at 1339-43 (discussing malevolent preferences); Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 3. 
at 1343-46 (discussing other-regarding preferences); id. at 1346 (concluding that "there is no a 
priori basis under welfare economics for ignoring certain preferences"). 
89. See id. at 1340. 
90. Id. ("[Sluch an approach is troubling . . . because the moral force and appeal of welfare 
economics lies in promoting the actual well-being of people, not in advancing some hypothetical 
notion of satisfaction that is distinct from that of the individuals who are the object of our con- 
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The wide sweep of Kaplow and Shavell's acceptance of preferences, 
regardless of their content, is exemplified in their treatment of "tastes 
for fairness." The authors stress that if "individuals have tastes for le- 
gal rules that comport with some personally held notions of fairness," 
then such preferences will be taken into account in the welfare calculus, 
in proportion to their strength, just like any other  preference^.^' This 
concession is important. The studies that we will detail in Part I1 are 
probative of preferences about the legal system that are similar to the 
"tastes for fairness" considered by Kaplow and Shavell. We will sug- 
gest that Kaplow and Shavell's commitment to respect tastes for fair- 
ness must extend to the tastes about the legal system that we will de- 
scribe. 
3. Well-Being: Restricted Views 
a. Matthew Adler and Eric Posner 
In recent works, Matthew Adler and Eric Posner have presented an 
unusually full philosophical defense of using the procedure of cost- 
benefit analysis to choose between competing government  regulation^.'^ 
They begin by noting that previous economic literature has not provided 
a firm moral foundation for the cost-benefit procedure.93 They argue 
that the application of cost-benefit analysis by agencies can be justified 
in terms of "a [moral] criterion with an impressive philosophical pedi- 
gree: overall well-being."94 
Adler and Posner acknowledge that the traditional welfare economic 
view of well-being, which equates well-being to the satisfaction of pref- 
erences, reflects an important truth about well-being.95 Well-being, they 
agree, must be in part a reflection of individual choice and desire.% But 
unlike Kaplow and Shavell, Adler and Posner adopt a "restricted- 
desire-based theory" of well-being: they argue that not all preferences 
cern."). 
91. Id. at 1350. 
92. Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15; see also Implementing Cost-Benefit, supra note 
15 (providing another articulation of the theory). The different forms of cost-benefit analysis are 
discussed infra at notes 114-120, 144-155 and the accompanying text. 
93. See Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 167 ("The reputation of cost-benefit 
analysis . . . among American academics has never been as poor as it is today . . . . Many law 
professors, economists, and philosophers believe that [cost-benefit analysis] does not produce 
morally relevant information and should not be used in project evaluation."). 
94. Id. at 195. Adler and Posner do not regard well-being as the only moral criterion relative 
to policy analysis, but they regard it as "morally relevant" to a significant number of policy 
decisions. See id. at 194-95. 
95. Id. at 199. 
96. See id. at 200. 
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have the quality that satisfying them increases the holder's well-being.m 
In particular, Adler and Posner are inclined to exclude "disinterested or 
morally motivated preferences" from the notion of well-being." They 
argue that the moral force of the project of promoting individual well- 
being is reduced if "well-being" includes desires for choices and events 
that individuals do not regard as an improvement in their own situation, 
but feel compelled to favor for other reasons, such as moral reasons.'' 
b. Howard Chang 
In the course of a recent scholarly exchange with Kaplow and Shav- 
ell, Howard Chang has presented philosophical arguments for basing 
the analysis of law on a "liberal theory of social welfare."100 Thus, 
Chang's work also tackles the moral question. He sketches a particular 
theory of social welfare, but unlike Adler and Posner, he does not ex- 
plore the practical question by linking his favored theory with an eco- 
nomic decision procedure that would best implement it.''' 
Chang rejects a moral position that identifies well-being with the 
satisfactions of whatever preferences individuals happen to hold. In- 
stead, he believes that a sound moral position should exclude "external 
preferencesw-preferences which do not have to do with an individual's 
own enjoyment of goods or entitlements, but instead have to do with 
"the assignment of goods and opportunities to others."lm In Chang's 
view (following the philosophy of Ronald Dworkin), external prefer- 
ences should be excluded from the moral goal because they "deny the 
equal concern and respect that utilitarianism owes all  individual^."^'^ 
For example, Chang accepts Dworkin's argument that an individual's 
preference that one racial group receive better treatment than another 
should be excluded from the measurement of well-being.lo4 The intui- 
tion behind this view is that it is incompatible with the moral principle 
of equal regard for individuals to allow one citizen's prejudiced prefer- 
ences about the fortunes of another citizen to influence the state's pol- 
97. Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 202. 
98. See Implementing Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 276. 
99. See Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 199-200 ("The standard economic theory 
[of well-being] is wrong . . . because [an individual] might prefer the project to the status quo 
for all manner of reasons, including but not limited to her welfare."). 
100. Chang. supra note 75. But see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell. Notions of Fairness 
Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency. 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000) 
(responding to Chang's arguments); but cf. Howard F .  Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 
110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) (offering a rejoinder to Kaplow and Shavell). 
101. See Chang. supra note 75. at 177-78. 
102. Id. at 183 (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 234 (1977)). 
103. Id. at 185. 
104. See id. at 183-84. 
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icy toward that second citizen.''' Yet an unrestricted-preference policy 
requires that conclusion. Thus, Chang's moral position, like that of 
Adler and Posner, holds that the field of preferences taken into account 
by welfare economics must be restricted on ethical g r~unds . "~  
At the same time, the "external" preferences Chang would exclude 
from well-being are not coextensive with the "moral" and "disinter- 
ested" preferences Adler and Posner are inclined to exclude. Not all 
moral or disinterested preferences are external. As Chang notes, indi- 
viduals who "prefer for moral reasons not to encounter pornography" 
in their daily lives offer a good example of a preference that is both 
moral and, in a relevant sense, personal.''' Their preferences can be 
understood in a way that does not explicitly refer to the opportunities 
and lives of ~thers . ' '~  Chang would count these preferences; Adler and 
Posner probably would not. And not all external preferences are moral: 
as Chang notes, some people might prefer to see their family or ethnic 
group receive special treatment due to simple feelings of sympathy and 
familiarity, not because they hold a moral or political view that informs 
that preference. log Chang would not count these preferences; Adler and 
Posner probably would. (It would, though, be a difficult question to 
decide whether such a preference is "disinterested" for Adler and Pos- 
ner's purposes.) 
These competing moral conceptions of well-being clearly differ in 
important ways. However, their true implications for the legal system 
turn on what procedures are available to implement them in practice. 
We now turn to that topic. 
C. Past Approaches to the Practical Question in Law and Economics 
While the debate from 1979 to 1981 revealed gaps in the moral jus- 
tification of law and economics, it had little impact on routine scholarly 
activity. The more theoretical scholars continued to favor "incomplete" 
analyses that assumed the existence of a valid measure of social wel- 
fare, and largely assumed away the task of how to assign welfare values 
in practice."' To the extent it was necessary to decide how to assign 
welfare values in practice, other scholars used tests based on maximiz- 
105. See id. at 195 (claiming that a social-welfare theory laundered of objectionable external 
preferences would "resistu corruption by illiberal preferences and remain[] faithful to the moti- 
vating ideals that give this philosophy [welfarism] much of its appeal"). 
106. Chang, supra note 75, at 194. 
107. Id. 
108. See id. 
109. See id. at 188. 
110. See supra Part I.A.l (discussing the previous work of Kaplow, Polinsky, Shavell. and 
others). 
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ing social wealth, measured by how much individuals are willing to pay 
for things."' This is the same procedure whose application to law was 
pioneered by Richard Posner. As we shall discuss below, it is closely 
related to the procedure of cost-benefit analysis, as taught in basic 
courses in welfare economics. (Following Matthew Adler and Eric Pos- 
ner's terminology, we will call this textbook cost-benefit analysi~."~) 
The situation today is different. Even sympathetic scholars are pay- 
ing sustained attention to the limitations of textbook cost-benefit analy- 
sis. They admit the necessity of developing methods of economic 
evaluation that do a better job of measuring individual well-being, thus 
creating a closer link between practical procedures and moral princi- 
ples. But even these efforts usually take textbook cost-benefit analysis 
as their starting point, proposing various refinements to its framework. 
We therefore describe textbook analysis briefly here before looking at 
the recent attempts to refine it. 
I. Textbook Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Textbook cost-benefit analysis is "a way of evaluating policy pro- 
grams by comparing their dollar costs against the market value of the 
benefits they provide."l13 In economic jargon, it employs a standard of 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as measured by willingness to pay. We sumrna- 
rize the steps below. 
a. The Concept of Willingness to Pay 
Textbook cost-benefit analysis measures losses and gains in propor- 
tion to the dollar values that the affected individuals would, or do, 
place on them. An individual who would pay $500 for clean water is 
taken to have a stronger preference for clean water than one who would 
pay only $300 for the same good. In practice, the analyst typically in: 
fers the relevant dollar values from observing the prices actually paid 
by individuals in market transactions for the goods affected by a policy 
change or goods related to them. If there is no market for a particular 
good that will be created or denied by a given policy, then the cost- 
111. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Eficient Regulation, 54 
BROOK. L. REV. 741, 762 (1988) (proposing the repeal of rent control statutes on the basis of 
wealth-based analysis; acknowledging the gap between wealth and individual utility, but asserting 
that "[tlhe advantage of the wealth test is that it offers a very good proxy for subjective utility, 
which is not subject to strategic misrepresentation common with subjective demands not backed 
with dollars."). 
112. See Implementing Cost-Benefir, supra note 15, at 280 (defining "textbook CBA" as "the 
sum of unweighted [compensating variations] based upon actual preferences"). 
113. Herbert Hovenkamp. Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice. 57 U .  CHI. L. REV. 
63, 67 (1990). 
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benefit analyst "infers (as best he can)" the market price that "would be 
expressed if there was a competitive market price."l14 One method for 
doing so is to attempt to identify market goods related to the non- 
market good the analyst seeks to value, and then to extrapolate a price 
for the non-market good. Another possible method is to poll respon- 
dents about how much they would be willing to pay for a particular 
entitlement, if it were possible to buy it. All of these examples reveal 
that "market prices . . . play a central part in the valuation of benefits" 
in textbook cost-benefit analysi~."~ Kaplow and Shavell recognize that 
most commentators have regarded cost-benefit analysis as the primary 
economic method for comparing legal rules.l16 
b. The Kaldor-Hicks Criterion 
The textbook cost-benefit analyst must make a decision after meas- 
uring the gains and losses from a policy. This decision, which evaluates 
the "goodness" of the proposed change, is performed through another 
jargon-laden test: Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. One applies the Kaldor- 
Hicks efficiency criterion by asking whether the winners from a possi- 
ble policy change could compensate the losers from the change enough 
so that the losers would be indifferent between the status quo, on one 
hand, and the world of the new policy plus the compensation, on the 
other, while leaving the winners enough benefits left over that they still 
prefer their new (winning) status.'17 
As previously discussed, the use of cost-benefit analysis leads to 
choosing the policy option that the affected individuals would support 
with the largest net willingness to pay-in effect, the option with the 
highest dollar value. The monetary value of the benefits to the winners 
114. DASGUPTA & PEARCE, supra note 21, at 38. 
115. Id. at 38-39. 
116. Kaplow and Shavell write that "[mlany legal academics seem to be under the impression 
that wealth maximization is the economic measure of social welfare." Kaplow & Shavell, supra 
note 3, at 995. Using the criterion of wealth maximization to make policy choices is practically 
equivalent to making them by appl :ng the textbook form of cost-benefit analysis. Cf. id. at 995- 
96 & nn.67-69; see also infra Pat 1.D.2.b. 
As Kaplow and Shavell note, wealth maximization means "maximizing the total dollar value 
of, or  willingness to pay for, social resources." Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 995. Text- 
book cost-benefit analysis does the same thing. It identifies the amount of money that the indi- 
vidual would be willing and able to pay in order to get that option-in other words, its dollar 
value. It identifies the "cost" of a given option, in turn, with the amount in dollars that the indi- 
vidual would be willing and able to pay in order to get the competing policy options that he 
cannot get if the first option is chosen. See DASGUPTA & PEARCE, supra note 21, at 40. 47. In 
this way, textbook cost-benefit analysis simply selects the policy option that is supported by the 
largest (numerical) willingness to pay (i.e., backed by the most dollars). It is therefore equivalent 
to wealth maximization as defined by Posner. 
117. See Hovenkamp, supra note 113, at 64-67; Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 
190-91. 
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from such an option will exceed the monetary value of the costs to 
those who lose from such an option. It follows that the winners from 
any policy that is chosen by cost-benefit analysis could fully compen- 
sate the losers and still have some surplus left-which is simply to say 
that any such policy satisfies the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.'18 
The great convenience of textbook cost-benefit analysis is that it 
purports to make it possible to compare how much well-being different 
individuals receive from the same policy by (as it were) simply adding 
and subtracting. Market prices provide the toehold that enables eco- 
nomic formalism to be applied in practice. Market prices are concretely 
measurable in the real world, and they provide a handy numerical 
measure of the relative strengths of different individuals' preferences, 
making tradeoffs possible. 
Yet the simplicity of the textbook cost-benefit analysis procedure is 
offset by serious weaknesses. Note that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion used 
in textbook cost-benefit analysis evaluates whether the losers from a 
policy could be fully compensated by the winners. Actual compensation 
is not required and is not normally expected, although it could be paid 
in theory from general tax revenues. As many critics have pointed out, 
this fact makes the moral relevance of textbook cost-benefit analysis 
very debatable. 'Ig 
Most crucially, weighing preferences for policies according to 
money means that the preferences of the rich count more. The effect of 
Kaldor-Hicks cost-benefit analysis is to give entitlements (e.g., the 
right to be protected by a legal rule) to the parties who would be will- 
ing to pay more (in dollars) for them. The measures of preference 
strength in this procedure are therefore subject to being distorted by 
what economists call "wealth effects;" a poor person might desire a 
good more than his wealthy friend, but cost-benefit analysis will give 
the good to the rich person because she will be willing to pay more for 
it.''' 
2. Challenging the Consensus: Behavioral Research 
Beginning in the late 1980s, a forceful critique called into question 
118. See Rethinking Cost-Benefit. supra note 15, at 190-91. 
119. See, e.g., Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 190 ("Most economists appear to 
concede that the Kaldor-Hicks standard is not, by itself, normatively desirable."). The moral 
criticisms of Richard Posner's wealth maximization norm in Part I.B.l also function as criticisms 
of the direct moral relevance of textbook cost-benefit analysis. Wealth maximization is essen- 
tially the moral view that a properly performed textbook cost-benefit analysis of a given policy 
omits no morally relevant information about that policy. Hence there is no need for intricate 
arguments to connect the cost-benefit analysis procedure to that moral norm, as (for example) 
Adler and Eric Posner must do as a result of their moral and practical positions. 
120. See POSNER. supra note 20. at 13. 
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the working assumptions that underlie the "Posnerian consensus" 
among mainstream legal economists on the value of cost-benefit analy- 
sis. This consensus assumes that there is a reliable instrumental connec- 
tion between the procedure of cost-benefit and moral values that deci- 
sion-makers care about, and that there is little need for explicit argu- 
ment to substantiate the assumed connection or to identify the relevant 
moral values. Herbert Hovenkamp, Robert Ellickson and others argued 
that there is little evidence that applying the techniques of textbook 
cost-benefit analysis to people's behavior will yield utility-maximizing 
legal rules. lZ1 
In this section, we examine the modern data that confirms this ob- 
servation. This field of research, called behavioral psychology (or just 
behavioralism), documents traits of individuals' actual choice-making 
behavior that do not easily conform to the rational-actor model that is 
utilized by neoclassical  economic^.'^^ In fact, behavioralism frequently 
identifies ways in which people's actual behavior can diverge systemati- 
cally from the predictions of the old rational-actor model.'" This raises 
the possibility of incorporating these predictable, though apparently 
irrational, behavioral choices into newer, more adequate models of the 
effects of different legal rules. In turn, analysts can employ these im- 
proved models to reach new conclusions about the legal system.'" 
The classical rational-actor mode1 assumes that "a person . . . can 
rank possible outcomes in order of expected utility."125 Roughly speak- 
ing, the model treats a person as if she ranked the different possible 
'actions available to her according to how much she desired (or dreaded) 
each of the various outcomes that a given action might bring about, 
multiplied by how likely she believes each outcome is to occur.lZ6 The 
121. See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A 
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV 23 (1989); Herbert Hovenk- 
amp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 4, 76 (1994). 
122. See Ellickson, supra note 121. 
123. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously (I): The 
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. 
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously (11): Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. 
L. REV. 1420 (1999) (presenting evidence that product manufacturers can and do use advertising 
and marketing techniques to cause consumers regularly to underestimate the risks of product- 
related injuries); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998) (arguing that evidence drawn from human behavioral psychology 
suggests that legal rules that have the effect of redistributing wealth among parties distort work 
incentives less than income taxes with a similar redistributive effect). 
124. See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 123 (arguing that behavioral inquiry into the respective in- 
centive-distorting effects of legal rules and taxation raises "a pressing normative issue . . 
.[namely,] is it proper for government to rely on redistributive legal rules [instead of taxes] to 
achieve its distributive objectives?"). 
125. Ellickson. supra note 121. at 23. 
126. See Shavell, supra note 29, at 2 nn.2-3 (providing a brief summary of the theory of 
expected utility). 
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model further assumes that when faced with such a choice, a person 
will choose the highest-ranked action-that is, "the course of action that 
will maximize his personal expected utility. "I2' 
Behavioral research suggests two general ways that individuals' ac- 
tual choices either violate this model or require the analyst to add com- 
plications to it. First is the class of psychological results called cogni- 
tive biases. These are persistent "deviations and cognitive illusions" 
which lead individuals to make errors in evaluating the outcomes asso- 
ciated with different choices.128 For example, individuals are subject to 
framing effects: they often make divergent choices when presented with 
what are really identical options, presented in a superficially different 
manner.I2' People respond differently to a hypothetical option that 
would "save" 200 people out of 600 than they do to an option that 
would "kill" 400 people out of 600.'~' Yet a rational actor would be 
indifferent between the same options.131 As another example, individu- 
als are also persistently subject to confirmation biases.13' They fail to 
give weight to new information that challenges their beliefs about the 
likely outcomes of actions, because their thinking is irrationally domi- 
nated by those data that tend to support the views they already h01d.l~~ 
Many other examples could be given. Research on cognitive biases has 
an important impact on the work of economists and particularly on the 
value of cost-benefit analyses. It suggests that the choices individuals 
make (say, to purchase a particular good at a particular price) are often 
a poor guide to the utility that they receive from the outcomes associ- 
ated with those c h 0 i ~ e s . l ~ ~  Thus, to the extent that market prices reflect 
irrational cognitive biases rather than rational bargaining, they will be a 
poor measure of the strength of individual preferences.I3' 
The burgeoning behavioral scholarship on bounded self-interest and 
social norms poses a second kind of challenge to the rational-actor 
model. The rational-actor model typically predicts that the parties to a 
sale, trade, or other transaction will each try to maximize their material 
gain from the tran~acti0n.l~~ Scholars typically treat material incentives 
as more fundamental than whatever ethical or altruistic motives a per- 
127. Ellickson. supra note 121. at 23. 
128. See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 123, at 645. 
129. Id. at 644-45. 
130. See id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 647-50. 
133. See Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 123, at 647-50. 
134. See id. 
135. Id. 
136. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 
1701 (1996). 
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son might entertain.I3' For example, the path-breaking analysis of enti- 
tlements in Ronald Coase's famous article The P r o b l e n l  of Social Cost 
is premised on the notion that, if an even slightly advantageous bargain 
is available to an individual, he will strike it, and to the extent he can 
appropriate the gains from the bargain to himself, he will do so.'38 In 
practice, however, it has become clear that individuals will often know- 
ingly refrain from engrossing every penny from a transaction, appar- 
ently in order to leave a fair portion of the surplus for the other 
party.139 Behavioral researchers have described these phenomena as a 
tendency to exhibit "bounded self-interest. "I4' 
Some economic analysts have sought to bring these observed diver- 
gences back within the reach of the rational-actor model by theorizing 
that individuals' maximizing behavior is constrained by internalized 
social norms of a more or less definite character.l4I A growing body of 
literature examines norms, developing theories of how they come to be 
and are perpetuated from individual to individual, and attempts to come 
up with ways to incorporate them into economic m0de1s.I~~ 
It is tempting to envision a connection, deep in the doctrinal struc- 
ture of law and economics, between increased attention to behavioral 
research (and thus to the practical question) and the recent increased 
interest in providing philosophical defenses of the economic approach. 
Perhaps the previous complacency of law and economics scholars about 
analyzing the moral foundations of their reform proposals depended 
upon the premise that observing "revealed preferences" in the market- 
'place was an uncontroversial way to isolate effects on well-being- 
137. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of 
Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1577-78 (2000) ("Almost all economists . . . practice 
moral skepticism by exploring efficient institutional arrangements for rationally self-interested 
actors."). 
138. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
139. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 3, at 13, 21-23 (describ- 
ing the Ultimatum Game). 
140. See id. at 16 ("[Wle use the term bounded self-interest to refer to an important fact 
about the utility function of most people: They care, or act as if they care, about others, even 
strangers, in some circumstances."); see also Ellickson, supra note 121, at 45-48 (discussing. 
imposition of cultural norms on the rational-actor model). 
141. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 973. 
142. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 137, at 1579 (proposing to "extend economics" to "chart 
the distribution, effects, and causes of internalized valuesn); see also Posner, supra note 136, at 
1697; cf. Ellickson, supra note 121, at 45-48 (alteration in original) (presenting "a suggestive 
model of the internalization of culture"). Kaplow and Shavell make their own contribution to this 
genre, offering a speculative account of how inculcated social norms with a cultural or biological 
origin may account for the (to them spurious) appeal of notions of fairness to legal scholars. See 
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1021-24. But see Lawrence Mitchell, Understanding Norms, 
49 U .  TORONTO L.J. 177 (1999) (criticizing "the new norms jurisprudes" for adopting an exces- 
sively external and positivistic view of social norms that neglects the properly normative, obliga- 
tory quality of adherence to norms). 
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uncontroversial enough that an explicit defense was largely unneces- 
~ a r y . ' ~ ~  To the extent that behavioral research has shown that people's 
actual choices often do not conform to the presuppositions of the ra- 
tional-actor model, it has thrown the underlying assumptions about 
well-being into question as well. An independent definition of well- 
being-required by the data-requires a philosophical, and not merely 
economic, justification. 
Whatever the reasons, it is clear that a new series of answers to 
both questions is emerging. Above, we discussed the principle of well- 
being. In the next section, we consider the ferment on the practical 
front-the ways scholars have proposed to turn the moral aspiration of 
promoting well-being into a practical reality. 
D. Contemporary Approaches to the Practical Question 
1. Adler and Posner 's Improved Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Adler and Posner's discussion of the practical component of eco- 
nomic analysis is highly sensitive to the distinction between practical 
and moral goals. Adler and Posner agree with the critics of textbook 
cost-benefit analysis that the economic norm directly implicated in the 
procedure-Kaldor-Hicks efficiency-"lacks genuine normative im- 
p~r t . " ' "~  Therefore cost-benefit analysis (CBA) "itself must be recog- 
nized to lack normative significance. Adler and Posner nevertheless 
support the use of cost-benefit analysis to choose legal rules in many 
circumstances, because, they argue, the procedure has an instrumental 
tendency to serve the value of overall well-being, which does have 
normative significance: 
CBA is a decision procedure. It is a technique used by agencies 
for choosing between options, a technique whose justifiability 
must be evaluated in light of normative criteria with which CBA 
is only contingently connected. . . . [Tlhere is a genuine norma- 
tive criterion that does plausibly justify the use of CBA, and 
that is the criterion of overall well-being.146 
While Adler and Posner aim to defend the use of cost-benefit analy- 
sis in agency decisionmaking, they do not defend textbook cost-benefit 
143. See Herbert Hovenkamp. Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U .  CHI. L. 
REV. 63, 73 (1990). 
144. Implemenring Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 1109. 
145. Id. at 1110. 
146. Id. 
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ana1y~is . l~~ Rather, they shoulder the task of "rethinking" cost-benefit 
analysis, and propose refinements that they hope will make it an attrac- 
tive procedure for agencies to use to maximize well-being.I4' To revert 
to our framework, their work attempts to sketch the outlines of a satis- 
factory practical position. 
For our purposes, there are three important differences between 
Adler and Posner's 'improved' cost-benefit analysis and textbook cost- 
benefit analysis. First, as we have seen, Adler and Posner argue that an 
improved cost-benefit analysis should reflect certain moral limitations: 
it should not include all preferences as part of overall well-being.'49 It 
should try, to the extent that such precision is justifiable, to exclude the 
effects of moral or disinterested preferences from analysis, even if 
those preferences are backed by d01lars.l~~ 
Second, improved cost-benefit analysis "might perhaps be refined 
to correct its endowment dependence:" that is, roughly, it might be 
refined to correct the problem of wealth effects.I5' Unfortunately, while 
Adler and Posner recognize the serious problems that wealth effects 
create for cost-benefit analysis, they can offer few solutions to the 
problems. They note that the ideal solution would be a method that be- 
gins by estimating (valid) preferences that are backed by willingness to 
pay, then changes the numerical weight of those preferences "by a fac- 
tor inversely proportional to the wealth of the person affected," thus 
equalizing the weight of the preferences of rich and poor.'52 Only then 
would an analyst trade off estimated welfare gains and losses.'53 Unfor- 
.tunately, the development of this sort of weighting procedure has pro- 
vided an almost mythical ideal for welfare economics, one that is still 
unrealized. As Adler and Posner admit, "[w]elfare economists have not 
yet, in fact, been successful in producing" any such weighting proce- 
d ~ r e . ' ~ ~  Third, in light of economists' inability to correct reliably for 
wealth effects, Adler and Posner conclude that improved cost-benefit 
analysis "must be confined to choice situations where endowment de- 
pendence does not cause too great a degree of inac~uracy." '~~ 
An appraisal of Adler and Posner's recommendation for using im- 
proved cost-benefit analysis to make policy choices must also take note 
of the fact that the authors are only concerned to promote "[tlhe use of 
Id. 
See Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15. 
See id. at 202. 
See id. 
Id. at 224 (emphasis omitted). 
Id. 
See Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 224. 
Id. 
Id. 
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CBA by [administrative] agencies,"156 not by legislators, common-law 
judges or juries. The practical problems that we detail later in this Arti- 
cle seem likely to be particularly acute in the common-law context. 
Thus, they are less likely to apply to Adler and Posner's position than 
they are to the positions of Kaplow and Shavell and other analysts we 
discuss. Nevertheless, as the discussion in preceding sections has 
shown, many academics do not share Adler and Posner's apparent hesi- 
tation to intrude economic norms into the analysis and reform of the 
common law. As a careful and sophisticated attempt to refine cost- 
benefit analysis and to make it a valid practical procedure, Adler and 
Posner's work is relevant beyond the agency context. As we have also 
suggested, it is also still characterized by a number of problems. 
2. Professors Kaplow and Shavell 
Kaplow and Shavell do not commit themselves to a particular posi- 
tion on how analysts should aggregate the satisfaction of individual 
preferences to calculate the total welfare effects of a poli~y. '~ '  Their 
article represents a call for analysts to apply preference-based methods 
of decision-making to the exclusion of fairness concepts.'58 It does not, 
however, offer a single-best approach to the problems of trading off 
preferences in making policy  decision^.'^^ In our terms, Kaplow and 
Shavell's answer to the moral question is clearer than their answer to 
the practical one. 
Nevertheless, the concept of preference is not self-defining. And in 
the course of describing the welfare economic framework, and in re- 
sponding to anticipated objections, Kaplow and Shavell gradually reveal 
a practical position that is distinctive in its treatment of different possi- 
ble preferences. We detail here some of the important aspects of that 
position. 
156. Id. at 168. 
157. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 988. 
158. See id. at 1315. Kaplow and Shavell state: 
[Wlith regard to our primary audience of legal academics and other serious ana- 
lysts of legal rules. the question is how best to conduct this enterprise over time, 
which is to say, how to design a research agenda. Such an agenda includes prelimi- 
nary fact gathering and analysis, followed by an ongoing process of refinement and 
reformulation of hypotheses combined with empirical tests. The process exploits a 
well-recognized and important synergy between theoretical and empirical work. . . 
. In this setting, it is clear that the overall research program should be formulated 
by direct reference to . . . the advancement of individuals' well-being. 
Id. 
159. Id. at 988 (emphasis in original) ("[Llegal policy analysis should be guided by some 
coherent way of aggregating individuals' well-being."). 
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a. Attitude Toward Orthodox Paretianism 
A notable feature of Kaplow and Shavell's position is their sympa- 
thy toward introducing into the normative analysis of law economic 
methods that go beyond the neoclassical analysis often presented as 
"welfare economics" in  textbook^.'^^ Traditional welfare economics 
gauges changes in individual utility by looking to revealed preferences 
(i.e., preferences expressed in individuals' observable choice-making 
behavior). The analyst does not look "behind" individuals' choice- 
making behavior to impose an objective value on utility changes.I6' 
Moreover, utility is assumed to be ordinal, not cardinal; direct interper- 
sonal comparisons of utility are not permitted.16* 
Similarly, economists traditionally have not treated "preferences" 
as complex psychological entities. Instead, they have defined them in 
external terms, as a simple function of individuals' acts of choice.163 
This immensely simplifies the empirical problem of gathering data on 
the utility that individuals receive from particular 0pti0ns.l~~ If individ- 
ual Dori, upon being offered a choice of two alternatives E or F 
chooses F, then option F is deemed, as a matter of definition, to give 
Dori greater utility than option E did. The economist will assign a 
higher numerical utility value to F than to E in Dori's "individual util- 
ity function." An individual's utility function is the ordering of all of 
her (relevant) preferences in numerical order, according to the utility 
numbers that have been assigned to different outcomes in light of the 
.individual's choice-making behavior. As long as each numbered out- 
come is preferred by the individual in question to all lower-numbered 
outcomes and no higher-numbered outcomes, the particular numbers 
assigned to each outcome are arbitrary, a matter of convenience for the 
economist. This is what is meant when economic measures of utility are 
described as "ordinal." The neoclassical approach continues to define 
160. See Tyler Cowen, Introduction to ECONOMIC WELFARE xiii (Tyler Cowen ed.. 2000) 
(observing that "[mlost economists pay lip service to . . . [traditional] Paretianism, and teach it 
to their classesn but use cost-benefit analysis to evaluate policies in practice); Kaplow & Shavell, 
supra note 3, at 998-99 (suggesting that their presentation may appear novel because "the [con- 
temporary] welfare economic framework developed by economists has not been adequately pre- 
sented in legal academic discoursen). 
161. See Cowen. supra note 160; see also VARIAN. supra note 20. 
162. See Cowen. supra note 160. 
163. See generally VARIAN, supra note 20, chs. 4, 7. Varian's leading undergraduate text- 
book summarizes the neoclassical approach by observing that "the theory of consumer behavior 
has been reformulated entirely in terms of consumer preferences, and utility is seen only as a 
way to describe preferences . . . ." Id. at 54. The concept of preference, in turn, is only a way 
of describing actual choices: "[ilt follows from [the rational-actor] model of consumer behavior . 
. . that the choices [individuals] make are preferred to the choices that they could have made." 
Id. at 119-20. 
101. See id. 
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orthodox welfare economics, as taught in university courses, to this 
day. It is also the approach to which Professors Kaplow and Shavell 
give allegiance-some of the time. 
Even after the analyst has created all of the necessary individual 
welfare functions, the assumptions built into the neoclassical framework 
sometimes make it difficult to reach judgments about effects on social 
welfare-the total effects on all individuals' utility associated with a 
particular policy decision.I6' The main criterion of social welfare em- 
ployed in neoclassical welfare economics is Pareto Under 
this criterion, Option A is superior (economists use the term 'Pareto- 
superior') to Option B if no one has lower utility in A than in B and 
someone has higher utility in A than B. In the welfare economics para- 
digm, this means that A is Pareto-superior to B if at least one individual 
prefers A to B and no individual prefers B to A. 
The Pareto-superiority criterion has two advantages. First, because 
it is defined purely in terms of ordinal preference relations, it can be 
applied without making interpersonal cardinal utility comparisons. It is 
therefore adaptable to the empirical methods of neoclassical economics. 
Second, the Pareto-superiority criterion has generally been thought to 
embody an uncontroversial set of ethical  commitment^.'^^ Intuitively, if 
someone would prefer a given social change to be made, and no one 
would prefer that it not be made, then we are likely to think that the 
change would represent an improvement. However, it has been ques- 
tioned whether the Pareto criterion contradicts ethical or moral intui- 
tions in some cases.I6' 
The chief weakness of the Pareto-superiority criterion is that it can- 
not be used directly to evaluate sets of policy options when each option 
under consideration would cause gains to some individuals and losses to 
others. In such a situation, some individuals will prefer the status quo 
while others will prefer a change. Thus, no option will be Pareto- 
165. See Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 3. at 985-98. 
166. See generally id. 
167. See CATHERINE M. PRICE. WELFARE ECONOMICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 7 (1977) 
("Pareto's analysis maintains near-universal acceptability by avoiding any controversial distribu- 
tional judgment, though only by ignoring altogether this important facet of welfare."). 
168. See Amartya Sen. The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal. 78 J .  POL. ECON. 152 (1970) 
(presenting a formal argument that the Pareto criterion is incompatible in principle with a liberal 
morality that would grant to each individual a minimal sphere of activity within which hislher 
will is sovereign). Kaplow and Shavell, of course, give the Pareto criterion pride of place in 
their normative theory. Their criticism of the principles of fairness emphasizes that giving inde- 
pendent weight to such principles logically entails (under certain other assumptions) that Pareto- 
inferior policy options-ones that every affected person finds less preferable than some other 
option-would be selected in some (perhaps purely hypothetical) circumstances. See generally 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict Between Norions of Fairness and the Pareto Prin- 
ciple. 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 63 (1999) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell. Conflict]; cf. Kaplow 
& Shavell. supra note 3. at 1012-13 n.102 (giving an informal summary of the same argument). 
368 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 53:2:335 
superior to the others. A huge number of real-world policy choices 
have this forrn.l6' In short, Pareto-efficiency analysis cannot generally 
determine choices between different possible legal r ~ 1 e s . l ~ ~  The judg- 
ment that one may wish to make in such cases is whether the gains ex- 
perienced by some, in a given project, outweigh the losses undergone 
by others. If a cardinal measure of utility is available, the welfare 
economist can suggest a natural way of doing so: sum up utility gains 
and losses across all individuals, and select the policy option with the 
associated highest net value. But orthodox Paretian analysis rejects car- 
dinal measures of utility and disallows such interpersonal welfare com- 
parisons. 
By contrast, Kaplow and Shavell acknowledge that applied policy 
analysis cannot be carried out unless ordinalism is supplemented by 
some method of making interpersonal utility comparisons: "Implicit in 
any social welfare function is a comparison of, and a way of trading 
off, different individuals' ~tilities."'~' While Kaplow and Shavell admit 
that the tools of welfare economics provide no "uncontroversial, verifi- 
able way" to make such comparisons, they insist, on a somewhat weak 
note, that "there do exist coherent approaches to the task."'" Apart 
169. See PRICE, supra note 167, at 19. 
170. See POSNER, supra note 20, at 14-15 (observing that "the conditions for Pareto superior- 
ity are almost never satisfied in the real world," so that "[wlhen an economist says that . . . 
some . . . policy or state of the world is efficient, nine times out of ten he means Kaldor-Hicks 
efficientn). Kaplow and Shavell agree that the Pareto criterion has little direct application to 
particular problems of policy choice, but stress that it "nevertheless has powerful implications 
for what criteria for making policy choices one can plausibly employ." Kaplow & Shavell, supra 
note 3, at 1015 (emphasis in original). Again, this refers to Kaplow's and Shavell's formal argu- 
ment that non-preference-based modes of evaluation should be rejected because they require one 
to approve certain policy changes even though all affected individuals would, in the imagined 
(perhaps real) situations, prefer the status quo to the change. See generally Kaplow & Shavell, 
Conflict, supra note 168. 
171. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 985 n.42. 
172. Id. (citing, inter alia. JONATHAN BARON, MORALITY AND RATIONAL CHOICE 144 
(1993). and John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Com- 
parisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309, 317-20 (1955)). Kaplow and Shavell appear to be 
particularly attracted to Harsanyi's intricate work on interpersonal comparisons. Roughly. Har- 
sanyi proposed that utilities could be compared by constructing a matrix, each of whose elements 
represents the effect of one competing policy upon one affected person. See Adler & Posner. 
supra note 15, at 206-07 (providing a slightly more detailed summary, which our summary 
closely tracks, of Harsanyi's proposal). The matrix will have as many elements as the number of 
competing policy options being weighed times the number of persons affected by it. Id. Each 
element represents a state: being this person subjected to this policy. Id. Then Harsanyi imagines 
that an impersonal observer could rank all of the individual states from most desirable to least, 
and that this could be used (with further manipulations) as the basis for a comparison of the 
overall welfare effects of each outcome on the population as a whole. Id. Despite the ingenuity of 
Harsanyi's proposal, the above description should suggest that there are significant difficulties in 
using it as a routine tool for comparing policies. 
Another, older approach is associated with W. Armstrong, and involves arranging different 
outcomes in a scale according to which each one is 'barely preferred' to the ones above it. See 
DASGUPTA & PEARCE, supra note 21, at ch. 1.4 (describing Armstrong's theory). 'Bare prefer- 
ence' is taken as corresponding to a fixed magnitude that is assumed to be the same for each 
20021 Law and Economics 369 
from interpersonal comparisons, the authors also acknowledge that the 
analyst's choice of a numerical utility scale for each individual is con- 
strained when the individual faces choices whose outcomes exhibit un- 
certainty.ln In sum, while the preference framework of traditional wel- 
fare economics is still central for Kaplow and Shavell, the authors also 
envision an extension of more speculative conceptions of individual and 
social utility into the mainstream of law and economics, while retaining 
the preference framework. 
b. Attitude Toward Cost-BeneJTt Analysis and Wealth 
Egects 
Considering Kaplow's and Shavell's explicit rejection of wealth 
maximization as a moral norm,174 one might expect that the authors 
would support modifying textbook cost-benefit analysis by adjusting 
preference strength to compensate for wealth effects, thus aligning cost- 
benefit analysis more closely with well-being.17' Equally, one might 
attempt to gauge preference strength in a wealth-neutral manner by sur- 
veying individuals about their preferences and asking them to express 
their willingness to pay for certain outcomes or entitlements against a 
hypothetical budget that is the same for each person. 
However, Kaplow and Shavell appear sympathetic to using simple 
wealth in practice as a proxy measure of social welfare. Economic 
analysis based on maximizing wealth, they argue, "may in fact rea- 
sonably approximate maximization of social welfare in many con- 
text~.""~ Moreover, they argue that normative models that equate social 
individual, and different persons' gains and losses can therefore (in theory) be measured against 
an interval scale of utility whose units correspond to the 'bare preference' relation. Id. 
173. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 979 n.33. 985 n.42 (noting that when modeling 
choice under uncertainty, individual utility indices must obey von Neumann-Morgenstern axi- 
oms); see also DASGUPTA & PEARCE, supra note 21. at 31-32 & n.1 (explaining the von Neu- 
mann-Morgenstern index). 
174. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
175. Cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3. at 992 n.58 (discussing the economic literature on 
optimal income taxation which attempts to incorporate a concern for the effects of the distribu- 
tion of wealth). 
176. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 997. Kaplow and Shavell give no particular argu- 
ment for this confidence that wealth maximizationlorthodox cost-benefit analysis is a good ap- 
proximation of social welfare; it appears to be a simple intuition about a rather thorny empirical 
matter. See also id. at 993 (asserting a belief that "many legal rules probably have little effect on 
the distribution of income"). Kaplow and Shavell's belief that cost-benefit analysis of legal rules 
may be helpful despite its omission of distributional effects may also derive from their often 
expressed view that legislatures are better placed than courts to fix distributional inequality. See 
id. at 994 n.65. 995 n.66. However, they offer no empirical support for the proposition that 
legislatures ever, in fact, perform Kaldor-Hicks corrections of private law maldistributions. 
In our minds, the last word on such arguments, which have enjoyed currency for at least two 
decades, belongs to Duncan Kennedy. See Duncan Kennedy. Law-and-Economics from the Per- 
spective of Critical Legal Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALCRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND 
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welfare to "some simple wealth-like aggregate" may be useful for ana- 
lytical  purpose^.'^ In both of these respects, "although wealth is not in 
itself deemed to be valuable, analysis that assesses policies based on 
their aggregate impact on wealth will often prove useful. "I7* Thus, Kap- 
low and Shavell are attracted to cost-benefit analysis not only as a theo- 
retical tool, but also as an answer to the practical question.17' At the 
same time, they appear willing to entertain other possible decision pro- 
cedures as long as they are solely defined by their consequences and are 
primarily based on the satisfaction of actual preferences. 
c. Preferences: How Are They Identified? 
While Kaplow and Shavell reject content-based censorship of pref- 
erences, they do suggest that some preferences should be excluded from 
welfare calculations because of the circumstances in which they are 
elicited. Their qualms extend to several different types of potential 
preferences. 
i. Uninformed or Self-Defeating Preferences 
Behavioral law and economics challenges the revealed-preference 
framework by detailing the ways in which individuals' actual choices 
may not effectively promote their own well-being. One of the most im- 
portant limitations on individuals' ability to maximize their own well- 
being is the difficulty of gathering and adequately processing informa- 
tion in real-life  situation^.'^^ In Kaplow and Shavell's framework, this 
raises the possibility that an individual (call her Dori) might squarely 
choose policy A over policy B,  even though Dori's other preferences 
suggest that she should prefer B to A. We would know this happened if 
a competent economist, drawing on sufficient empirical data about 
Dori's other preferences, would construct an individual utility function 
THE LAW 465. 469 (Peter Newman ed. 1998) ("Legislatures never, ever pass statutes that adjust 
tax and transfer programs to make up for the impact of modifications of private law rules (though 
of course they could if they wanted to."). 
177. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 997. 
178. Id. 
179. There is some tension between Kaplow's and Shavell's apparent attraction to cost-benefit 
analysis and their emphasis on the novelty and the moral attractiveness of the position they set 
out in Fairness Versus Weyare. Kaplow's and Shavell's frequent invocations of "well-being," 
and their attention-getting insistence that allowing decision-makers to employ norms of fairness 
risks "mak[ing] everyone worse off," and "stands in opposition to human welfare at the most 
basic level," lose some emotive punch if what norms of fairness "stand in opposition to" is a 
regime that, judging from the authors' remarks, might frequently involve choosing legal rules by 
textbook cost-benefit analysis. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1016. 1017. 
180. See Jolls et al., supra note 139, at 14-15 (describing the effects of cognitive limitations 
on individuals' ability to respond correctly to incentives); cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 
1332 (noting that "there are limits to the amount of information that any individual can absorb"). 
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for Dori that assigns a higher utility value to B than to A. Kaplow and 
Shavell's response is to trump the preference actually expressed by 
Dori, for Dori's own good.Ig1 That is, they would require the legal sys- 
tem to provide policy B, and not policy A, as long as B would satisfy 
Dori's other preferences to a sufficient degree to outweigh the actual 
loss (if any) to her welfare incurred in disregarding her uninformed 
choice between the two policies.182 
Deciding which policy will maximize Dori's welfare in such a situa- 
tion is not a straightforwardly empirical matter; it requires an exercise 
of judgment on the analyst's part. Once one acknowledges that a pref- 
erence (or a decision intended to satisfy preferences)lg3 can be "mis- 
taken," the job of distinguishing "true" preferences from "irrational" 
or "mistaken" ones is essentially a matter of mutual adjustment of the 
data. The welfare economist draws on the available empirical informa- 
tion about individuals' desires (market prices, choice behavior, expres- 
sions of opinion, psychological principles, etc.) and postulates a pattern 
of underlying preferences that fit the data and imposes a psychological 
coherence on it.Ig4 To the extent an analyst discovers more and more 
data that tend to reflect the influence of a preference or choice that he 
has previously treated as "irrational" or "uninformed," he should tend 
to regard that preference as increasingly stable, non-anomalous, and 
entitled to increased weight in the welfare calculus. 
ii. Apparent Preferences That Are a Product of 
Framing Effects 
In contrast to their limited consideration of uninformed preferences, 
Kaplow and Shavell are reluctant to give any weight to "preferences" 
that disappear or diminish in intensity when they are elicited by a trivi- 
ally different stimulus. In particular, they state that opinion research 
into tastes for fairness is often of "limited value" due to such framing 
181. We assume for purposes of this hypothetical that the choice between policies A and B has 
no other welfare effects on third parties. Otherwise, if the welfare gain to others from choosing 
policy B might outweigh the benefits to Dori from policy A it might be proper to trump Dori's 
preference for A even if it were fully consistent with her other preferences and even if Dori were 
really a net gainer from policy A (contra the hypothetical). 
182. See Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 3, at 1331 ("[Plroper welfare economic analysis takes 
these [informational] imperfections into account."); id. at 1332 ( " w h e n  individuals' decision- 
making capacity is inherently limited, different legal rules may be appropriate."). 
183. As Kaplow and Shavell note, the distinction between an individual who does not know 
how something will satisfy his preferences, and an individual who does not know what his pref- 
erences are, is merely "a semantic difference" that can be varied to suit the analyst's purposes. 
Id. at 1332 n.908. 
184. See id. at 986 ("In several different respects, the approach of welfare economics in- 
volves value judgments."). 
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effects.18' They believe that "preferences" that are products of framing 
effects are not preferences at all. 
d. How Should Preferences Be Measured? 
Kaplow's and Shavell's treatment of preferences also reveals a con- 
cern about the difficulty of gauging the strength of preferences that 
cannot be satisfied in market transactions. This concern is in some ten- 
sion with the authors' emphasis on the ability of welfare economics to 
take account of "everything that an individual might value,"186 and their 
claim that welfare economics differs importantly from wealth maximi- 
zation. 18' 
For example, in the course of discussing the normative implications 
of welfare economics for procedural law, Kaplow and Shavell discuss 
research by E. Allan Lind, Tom Tyler, and other psychologists suggest- 
ing that individuals place significant value on legal procedures that are 
perceived as fair.188 Kaplow and Shavell criticize Lind and Tyler for not 
trying to give a numerical value to individuals' preference for proce- 
dural fairness by "simply asking how much, if anything, individuals 
would have been willing to pay . . . for greater participation or proce- 
dures that in other respects were viewed as fairer."18' 
Indeed, Kaplow's and Shavell's concerns about non-market prefer- 
ences extend to tastes for fairness generally. They observe that: 
[I]t may be difficult to measure individuals' tastes with regard 
to the fairness of legal rules. There usually do not exist market ' 
transactions that would provide a basis for quantifying individu- ' 
als' tastes for notions of fairness in the manner that their taste, 
say, for apples can be inferred from its market price."' 
However, the authors note that one can get some insight into the values 
of hard-to-value goods by looking to the values of closely related goods 
or market goods bundled with the nonmarket good in question. lgl 
A moral position as "encompassing" as the one Kaplow and Shavell 
185. See id. at 1351 (asserting that the "unreliability of polling information is suggested by 
the sensitivity of responses to modest changes in the wording of the questions posed"); see also 
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3. at 1351 n.946 (discussing literature on framing effects. and 
divergences between willingness to pay for entitlements as expressed in opinion surveys, on one 
hand, and as actually observed in life, on the other); see also supra notes 128-131 and accompa- 
nying text. 
186. Kaplow & Shavell, supra, note 3, at 980. 
187. See supra notes 174-179 and accompanying text. 
188. See infra notes 220-244 and accompanying text. 
189. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1212-14 & n.613. 
190. Id. at 1350-51. 
191. See id. at 1351. 
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set out in Fairness Versus Welfare must, if it is to be consistent to its 
own premises, remain open to the existence of preferences expressed in 
non-market actions. Their statements indicate that they agree.'= And 
such a system should be willing to accord non-market preferences sig- 
nificant weight in the social welfare calculus, as long as the reasonably 
available data suggest they are strongly held. If there are intrinsic diffi- 
culties in giving quantitative values to such preferences, then, we would 
argue, such difficulties do not imply that legal reform should go for- 
ward, ignoring non-market preferences and confining its attention to 
preferences that are easily weighed. That would subordinate the ethical 
imperative of promoting actual well-being to the intellectual desirability 
of simplifying problems enough that they can fit into a formal economic 
analysis, and yield clear results. That is not the spirit of welfare eco- 
nomics. That spirit, as Kaplow and Shavell stress against the theorists 
of fairness, draws its "moral force" from being "grounded in the actual 
situations of real individuals. "Ig3 
E. The Consequences of Privileging Preferences 
We have argued above that the normative application of law and 
economics requires much more explicit moral justification than it has 
received in the past. Contemporary authors like Kaplow and Shavell, 
Adler and Posner, and Chang have taken up that challenge, articulating 
moral theories that differ in important ways but retain a focus on the 
moral criterion of well-being. Our guiding question is whether they will 
be able to implement those moral principles adequately in practice. 
We have already pointed out one serious problem. These new moral 
theories focus consciously on maximizing well-being, not social wealth. 
This underlines the need for practical procedures that can improve on 
textbook cost-benefit analysis by reducing the distortions caused by 
wealth effects. Yet as we have seen, despite increased attention to the 
problem and a good deal of hopeful prediction by Adler and Posner, 
and Kaplow and Shavell, there is little practical progress. Rigorous 
ways to go beyond market-price data remain few. 
In Part I1 of this Article we will turn to two other problems to 
which the new theories must respond. We show that there is empirical 
evidence-much of it compiled by Kaplow and Shavell's fellow legal 
economists-suggesting that Americans have substantial preferences for 
perceived fairness and other values in the legal system. In addition, 
192. See, e.g., id. at 1350 (noting that the question of the strength of individuals' tastes for 
notions of fairness is an empirical question that is "best answered by statisticians and opinion 
researchersn). 
193. Id. at 1354. 
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there is evidence that Americans prefer not to have economic and utili- 
tarian methods of decision-making play a large role in their legal sys- 
tem. If such preferences exist, they must be dealt with one way or an- 
other. We test the adequacy of Kaplow and Shavell's responses to the 
potential conflict that such preferences create. 
In Part 111, we offer predictions about the future development of 
law and economics. We suggest that the same discoveries about the 
preferences of citizens that create problems for Kaplow and Shavell's 
moral and practical positions are beginning to exercise an influence on 
law and economics scholarship more generally. We present reasons to 
suspect that in the years to come, economic theorists will begin advo- 
cating an increasingly distinctive and recognizable political program- 
toward increased control by professional regulatory agencies over the 
traditional areas of common-law adjudication, toward increased secrecy 
about government decision-making, and away from direct citizen par- 
ticipation in the formulation and application of legal policy. 
11. EVIDENCE OF LAW-RELATED PREFERENCES 
In this part, we address a hypothetical legal economist who has set- 
tled on one of the broadly consequentialist moral positions discussed in 
the first part of this Article. We seek to direct this analyst's attention to 
a factor that should be taken into account by the practical procedures he 
chooses, and that should influence which legal policies he will recom- 
mend. This factor is law-related preferences: individuals' desires and 
tastes with respect to the various aspects of their legal system. Such 
preferences are relevant to the practice of law and economics in two 
ways. 
First, analysts should seek to detect and measure the satisfaction of 
law-related preferences because their satisfaction is arguably a compo- 
nent of overall well-being. All the moral positions under discussion in 
the current literature concur that the satisfaction of individual prefer- 
ences often means an increase in well-being. Thus, to the extent that a 
particular legal reform would violate people's conceptions of the legal 
system, it may be inappropriate (morally inferior) to adopt it, even if 
the legal reform would otherwise increase well-being; for example, 
increasing the satisfaction of non-legal preferences. Law-related prefer- 
ences may then act as a sort of brake, limiting the application of pro- 
posals that would otherwise emerge from a less comprehensive analy- 
sis. In Part 11-A, we set the stage for this possibility by arguing that 
none of the major moral positions that analysts have recently proposed 
can be interpreted to exclude all law-related preferences from their re- 
spective conceptions of well-being. 
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Second, the American legal system is distinctive in the degree to 
which it allows citizen actors-non-lawyers, non-bureaucrats-a signifi- 
cant role in implementing legal procedures and deciding outcomes, no- 
tably through the institution of the jury, but also as voters, litigants, 
and in other roles. To the extent that lawyers or lay individuals have 
law-related preferences, perceiving particular rules or practices as fair, 
unfair, satisfying, improper, etc., these preferences are likely to influ- 
ence their behavior as participants in the legal system. That likelihood 
should be taken into account in formulating policies that rely on citizens 
to implement legal rules. In this way, preferences may act not only as a 
brake to legal reform, but also as a stumbling block. 
Both of these considerations matter only if law-related preferences 
are more than a figment of the theoretical imagination. Few doubt the 
existence of strong, widely-shared, morally relevant preferences for 
items like food, shelter, entertainment, and consumer goods. The ro- 
bust market for these goods is a form of intuitive evidence for the real- 
ity and strength of the preferences for them. By contrast, there is no 
obvious market for the satisfaction of law-related preferences. Our hy- 
pothetical reader may be skeptical: why worry about how to take ac- 
count of "preferences" that may not even exist? 
To answer that question, we collect in this Part the psychological 
literature that gives evidence of the reality of people's tastes for legal 
practices. We have divided this evidence into three categories. In Part 
II.B, we discuss individual preferences for specific legal procedures. 
We summarize the large psychological literature on "procedural jus- 
tice" and conclude that individual preferences for specific kinds of pro- 
cedure exist, seem to be strong, and are distinct from preferences for 
the outcomes that those procedures are likely to produce. We discuss 
the prospects for either integrating these preferences into applied eco- 
nomic analysis, or explaining them away. 
In Part II.C, we discuss individual preferences for specific legal 
rules. Experimental data on non-legal enforcement of norms and on 
behavioral psychology both suggest that in some cases people may pre- 
fer one of a pair of competing legal rules over the other (e.g., property 
rule protection over liability rule protection of a given entitlement in 
tort law). We argue in particular that Professors Kaplow and Shavell, 
who discuss this phenomenon, may have understated its importance. 
However, we conclude that law and economics generally seems amena- 
ble to including legal rule preferences in the utility calculus. 
In Part II.D, we discuss individual preferences for and against cer- 
tain kinds of decision-making. The data here suggest that individuals 
sometimes experience disutility when they are exposed to utilitarian or 
economic decision-making procedures. We discuss several experiments 
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describing this phenomenon. The prospect of this sort of law-related 
preference is especially troubling for economic analysis because it 
threatens to act as a "stumbling block," as discussed above. Such a 
preference makes it hard to promote economic norms while retaining 
citizen participation in the legal system. 
Our aim is to convince analysts that there is a creature in the room; 
it is not yet clear whether it is an 800-pound gorilla or mere 50-pound 
Rottweiller. The various data we gather are similar enough, and suffi- 
ciently suggestive of real preferences, that they should not be ignored 
or assumed away. There is a pressing need for more empirical studies 
to fix the scope and strength of law-related preferences.Ig4 With this in 
mind, we will close this part by considering one of the factors that is 
most likely to limit the scope of law-related preferences: people's 
knowledge of the law and its implications for our analysis considered in 
Part 11. E. 
A. The Moral Relevance of Law-Related Preferences 
If the right concept of well-being excludes the satisfaction of law- 
related preferences, then those preferences are relevant to economic 
policy analysis only as a stumbling block (a cognitive factor that may 
limit how well agents in the legal system do their jobs), not as a brake 
194. A word should be said about the possibility of law-related preferences for specific legal 
outcomes in individual cases, a topic we do not address in this Article. What we have in mind is 
not, say, a contract plaintiffs preference for a verdict in his favor, which can largely be under- 
stood as a simple preference for a favorable financial outcome, not (exclusively) a preference for 
justice. Rather, we mean the possibility that non-parties may have a cognizable preference for a 
certain outcome in a particular legal case. 
When welfare economists and agencies are weighing a project that will have an extensive 
impact on the natural environment, they sometimes seek to measure the preferences of individu- 
als who do not personally enjoy the environmental resources that would be damaged by the pro- 
ject, but who nevertheless are willing to pay to ensure that the environmental resource is pre- 
served. These "disinterested" preferences are called existence values. See Implemenring Cost- 
Benefit, supra note 15, at 281-82 (criticizing the use of existence values by some government 
agencies). Law-related preferences for legal outcomes, then, might be understood as existence 
values that attach to events that occur in courtrooms, not events in the natural environment. 
Again, we will not fully consider the possibility of such preferences in this Article. We note 
however that courts in highly publicized cases sometimes feel obligated to acknowledge the force 
of public sentiment in favor of a particular outcome. See, e.g.. In re Exxon Valdez, 1994 WL 
182856, *8-9 (D. Alaska 1994). The court, in Emon Valdez stated: 
It is the function of both Congress and the courts (principally the courts of appeal 
and supreme courts) to determine the extent to which public expectations with re- 
spect to financial responsibility are to be realized . . . . Were it otherwise, we 
would have a form of organized anarchy in which no one could count on what rule 
would apply at  any given time or in any given situation. 
Id. 
One may also think of the conduct of the participants in the explosive rioting in Los Angeles 
following the acquittal of Rodney King's police assailants. Whatever one's views of the moral 
relevance, or indeed the moral value or defensibility, of that conduct, it is surely prima facie 
evidence that many third parties held intense, law-related outcome preferences in King's case. 
20021 Law and Economics 377 
(a morally relevant factor). Kaplow and Shavell's unrestricted- 
preference view of well-being, however, clearly does include law- 
related preferences. Such preferences are closely akin to the "tastes for 
fairness" that Kaplow and Shave11 carefully acknowledge should find a 
place in proper economic analysis. 
Adler and Posner's view of well-being is more nuanced. Recall that 
Adler and Posner justify excluding moral and other disinterested pref- 
erences from their definition of well-being on the ground that an indi- 
vidual can hold such a preference and yet not believe that the outcome 
she morally prefers would increase her own welfare.lgs Adler and Pos- 
ner flatly reject Kaplow and Shavell's proposal to count tastes for fair- 
ness in the well-being calculus: "We do not believe that the fairness of 
a project increases its [welfare value] insofar as persons prefer the pro- 
ject just because they judge it to be fair."'% Nevertheless, we think 
Adler and Posner's position requires them to consider at least some 
law-related preferences. It seems clear that if law-related preferences 
exist, they may not always be disinterestedly "moral" in Adler and 
Posner's sense. Sometimes they might be better understood, in whole or 
in part, as simple affective tastes. Satisfying such law-related prefer- 
ences presumably does increase the welfare of the individual who holds 
them. As Chang points out, certain kinds of seemingly impersonal pref- 
erences may reflect the holder's feelings of sympathy or empathy for 
other people-here, perhaps others who are subject to the legal sys- 
tem-and thus cannot be dismissed as having no welfare effect on the 
preference holder.'" It seems psychologically implausible to deny that 
legal rules and practices can sometimes make individuals (even those 
who are not in danger of violating the rules, or benefiting directly from 
them) "feel better" or "feel worse," in a straightforward way, about 
themselves and their community. 
More fundamentally, the distinction between personal and disinter- 
ested preferences carries with it a good deal of philosophical and psy- 
chological baggage. From many credible philosophical perspectives, 
including an Aristotelian one, the fact that a legal rule or practice is 
perceived as morally right provides, in itself, a reason to take pleasure 
in it.''' Indeed, Adler and Posner themselves admit that the distinction 
between personal preferences and "moral" or "dis'interested" prefer- 
ences is extremely difficult to define coherently and may be philosophi- 
195. See Rerhinking Cost-Benefir, supra note 15, at 199-200. 
196. Id. at 244. 
197. See Chang. supra note 75. at 188. 
198. Cf. ARISTOTLE. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 11 (Terence Irwin trans.. 1999) ("[Tlhe things 
that please lovers of the fine are things pleasant by nature: Actions in accord with virtue are 
pleasant by nature, so that they both please lovers of the fine and are pleasant in their own 
right."). 
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cally indefen~ible. '~~ At best, we think, an analyst who adopts Adler 
and Posner's approach to economic analysis must address the relevance 
of law-related preferences on a case-by-case basis. 
An analyst like Howard Chang, who supports a "liberal theory of 
social welfare,"200 is more likely to take the categorical view that law- 
related preferences are "external  preference^"^^' and hence irrelevant. 
Chang, again, holds that external preferences should not be included in 
the calculation of well-being because they are incompatible with "the 
liberal ideals underlying utilitarianism. "2m 
Some possible law-related preferences clearly fail Chang's test. An 
individual's preference for Jim Crow laws, held on the ground that such 
laws express a valid racial hierarchy, must be excluded. It is a quintes- 
sential example of the sort of "racist or malicious preferences," prem- 
ised on inequality, that Chang rejects.203 But suppose a different cir- 
cumstance. Imagine a group of citizens who prefer a highly moralistic, 
promise-centered conception of contract law, one that emphasizes the 
availability of specific performance and that uses mandatory rules. Sup- 
pose further that these citizens want a moralistic contract regime not on 
economic grounds (they do not have views on whether it will allocate 
resources more or less efficiently than other contract regimes), but 
rather because they believe moralistic contract law is in keeping with 
the dignity of treatment that (they believe) all rational beings owe alike 
to one another. This is a law-related preference. It is premised on a 
non-utilitarian philosophy; it is a "taste for fairness" in Kaplow and 
Shavell's lexicon. And it is an external preference: the group would 
prefer that a particular set of contract rules govern all the members of 
their society, not just themselves. 
Does such a preference, in Chang's words, really "deny the equal 
concern and respect" that is "owe[d] all individuals," so as to justify 
excluding it entirely from welfare analysis, even if it is strongly held?2M 
Many points of view that may lead individuals to prefer certain legal 
rules or institutions are premised on understandings of the meaning of 
human equality that, while not identical to the views of liberal utilitari- 
ans like Chang, are hardly so different from them, or so repugnant, that 
it would be "awkward" to give them some weight in the welfare calcu- 
199. See Rethinking Cost-Benefit. supra note 15. at 202 ("[HIOW to provide a more precise 
and persuasive account of this 'restriction' remains a large and unsolved problem within the 
philosophical literature on well-being."); see id. at 202 n.98 (compiling sources). 
200. Chang, supra note 75, at 196. 
201. Id. at 183. 
202. Id. at 185. 
203. Id. at 178. 
204. Id. at 185. 
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1~s.'" Chang supports a liberal theory of welfare. But to the extent that 
Chang's theory denies real, felt preferences based on worldviews that 
do not sort with liberal utilitarian philosophy, its claim to being a genu- 
inely welfare theory is diminished; it reduces to a simple imposition of 
liberal preferences on the community. Presumably Chang would admit 
that the traits an individual perceives in her natural and physical envi- 
ronment can powerfully influence that individual's well-being. Why, 
then, be so quick to exclude the individual's perceptions of her social 
and institutional environment? Further, in America one would expect 
that legal institutions would form an especially important part of that 
environment. 
We think these arguments should give liberal legal economists 
pause about excluding law-related preferences from welfare calcula- 
tions. Having made our case for the relevance of law-related prefer- 
ences, we turn at last to evidence for their reality. 
B. Tastes for Procedural Justice 
From a traditional economic standpoint, procedure is a transaction 
cost: a necessary evil in a legal system whose chief purpose is to create 
incentives for welfare maximizing behavior.'06 Analysts like Kaplow 
and Shavell reject using independent notions of fairness to design legal 
procedures. They argue that doing so will distort the ability of the sys- 
tem to produce well-being maximizing outcomes.207 
Nevertheless, Kaplow and Shavell concede that, as in all areas of 
the law, individual tastes about legal procedures are an essential part of 
a proper welfare economics analysis. Kaplow and Shavell assert that 
tastes for procedures should "be weighted according to the extent indi- 
viduals actually would be willing in principle to expend resources to 
benefit from [them]."208 The relevant inquiry, then, is how strongly do 
people care about how the adjudication system works?209 Kaplow and 
Shavell have an intuition: "We suspect that individuals do not have suf- 
ficiently positive tastes for legal procedures [to change the outcome of a 
welfare analysis]. "*I0 We also have an intuition: they are wrong. 
205. Chang, supra note 75, at 187. 
206. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1165 ("The inherently instrumental character of 
procedure suggests that largely nonconsequentialist notions of fairness in procedure are inappro- 
priate to employ."). 
207. See id. at 1174-80. 
208. Id. at 1211. 
209. In this Article. we have separated the analysis of legal procedure into two components: a 
discussion of outcomes ("the availability of legal redressn) and a discussion of modes of adjudi- 
cation ("the manner in which adjudication is conductedn). Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 
1211. 
210. See id. at 1216. 
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Our intuition is supported by twenty-five years of empirical and 
psychological literature suggesting that individuals have independent 
tastes for certain legal procedures. The basic conclusion of the litera- 
ture is that individuals' happiness or unhappiness with the legal system 
is partially independent of the disposition of their case. Process can 
create its own ~t i l i ty .~"  
This understanding is in conflict with the functionalist's parasitic 
conception of procedure discussed above. It threatens to complicate 
welfare-economic analysis. Therefore, it is not surprising that Kaplow 
and Shavell, among others, attack the procedural justice literature on a 
variety of grounds.212 However, before describing this attack in greater 
detail, we would first like to explain exactly what it is empiricists have 
thus far asked, and concluded, about individual preferences for legal 
procedures. Thus, in Part 1I.B. 1 we describe the history, methodology, 
experimental data, and findings of procedural researchers. In Part 
II.B.2 we compare and contrast the competing psychological theories 
about preferences that researchers have constructed from this experi- 
mental data. In Part II.B.3 we discuss scholarly criticism of this re- 
search, and attempt to integrate it into the welfare economic paradigm. 
I. Procedural Justice in Review 
In 1975, John Thibault and Laurens Walker published their seminal 
Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis. In that book, the two 
researchers argued that individuals hold significant preferences for cer- 
tain kinds of procedures, specifically a preference for perceived fair- 
ness and a preference for process control.213 
Thibault and Walker began by positing a difference between prefer- 
ences about distributive justice (the way that things of value are allo- 
cated among persons or groups) and procedural justice (the modes of 
dispute resolution). They then attempted to explore the former prefer- 
ences by asking individuals, in a variety of contexts, how they liked 
their disputes resolved. 
They found, first, that individuals prefer adversarial procedures to 
inquisitorial ones,214 even though that control might not actually lead to 
211. This argument is not a moral case for the intrinsic value of procedural justice. For such 
an argument, see Laurens Walker et al., The Relation Between Procedural and Distributive Jus- 
rice, 65 VA. L .  REV. 1401, 1402-03 (1979). 
212. See Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 3, at 1212 n.613. 
213. Thibault and Walker argued that individuals preferred processes that they could control 
over ones that were controlled by a third party. JOHN THIBAULT & LAURENS WALKER, 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE : A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 13-14, 117-24 (1975). 
214. Id. at 72-77. 
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an accurate presentation of the facts.215 This result held true even when 
the adversary process led to an adverse outcome216 and when Thibault 
and Walker investigated the preferences of observers of legal proceed- 
ings, rather than  participant^.^" 
The two psychologists theorized that people's taste for adversary 
litigation (both as litigants and as members of society) related to their 
preferred distribution of control over the process between disputants 
and decision-makers. Simply put, fair procedures are seen to give liti- 
gants control; unfair procedures do not. People see ultimate decisions 
as fairer when the process that generated them was litigant led; and vice 
versa. 
Finally, Thibault and Walker proposed a connection between pref- 
erences for procedural and distributive justice. They argued that indi- 
viduals prefer process control because it enables them to retain control 
over outcomes that they desire. Thus, Thibault and Walker saw proce- 
dural justice as an important factor in individuals' understanding of 
distributive justice, but primarily a derivative one. Their instrumental 
argument for process values is summed up by their prescient message to 
the then-emerging law and economics movement: "any assessment of 
the economic factor [e.g., costs of procedures] ought to take into ac- 
count the social cost of a procedural system that either repeatedly fails 
to furnish accurate results or repeatedly fails to furnish results accept- 
able to the subjects of the process. "218 
E. Allan Lind and Tom R. Tyler, the second major duo of the pro- 
cedural justice literature, expanded on Thibault's and Walker's work in 
their 1988 book, The Social Psychology of Procedural J ~ s t i c e . ~ "  Lind's 
and Tyler's significant contribution lies in their constructing a psycho- 
logical theory to explain why individuals care about procedure: the 
"group value" theory. That theory argues that people are strongly af- 
fected by identification within groups, and that these groups are defined 
both by their "group identities" (unique shared characteristics) and their 
"group procedures." The former defines the group in its relationship 
to the outside world; the latter regulates how the group regulates it- 
215. Thibault and Walker found that adversaries skewed unhelpful facts to favor themselves. 
Thus. presented with evidence reflecting a 25/75 skew. adversaries presented a 36164 spin. In- 
quisitorial opponents did not. Moreover, the individuals knew they were putting a slant on the 
facts. See id. at 32-40. 
216. See id. at 76. 
217. Id. at 93, 113-16 (detailing a behind-the-Rawlsian-veil preference for adversary system). 
218. THIBAULT & WALKER, supra note 213. at 123. 
219. For a general review of Lind's and Tyler's work, see Paul G. Chevigny. Fairness and 
Participation. 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1211 (1989) (book review). 
220. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER. THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
230-37 (1988). 
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self."' Thus, our society's procedure is tied to our sense of identity: 
when procedures are unfair, our group (and thus our self) identity is 
damaged.222 
This general description of Lind's and Tyler's theory threatens to 
understate the strength of their book. They first offer a sophisticated 
critique of Thibault and Walker, focusing on the link in the earlier 
work between process control and distributive justice. Thibault and 
Walker believed that control over evidence and arguments would have 
both direct psychological effects on people, and indirect effects on 
institutional legitimacy. If people perceived processes to be fair, then 
they would also experience more happiness in the outcomes that they 
received. It would follow that people's preferences for process reflect a 
desire for a fair outcome rather than an external By contrast, 
Lind and Tyler argue for entirely different understanding of process 
preferences, one that places them in a primary position vis-a-vis out- 
comes. 
In practice, this means that Lind and Tyler had to test the relation- 
ship between perceptions of outcomes and perceptions of procedures. 
Summarizing various studies, Lind and Tyler concluded that regardless 
of whether individuals receive favorable or unfavorable legal outcomes, 
a fair process makes them more accepting of the outcomes and the legal 
system in  genera^."^ Fair legal process, they argued, "increase[s] satis- 
faction and . . . ameliorate[s] discontent across a wide variety of legal 
situations. 
The authors demonstrated the importance of process through their 
discussion of the "legitimation" effe~t ."~ Summarizing various earlier 
researchers, Lind and Tyler found that procedural unfairness could lead 
to erosion of individuals' obedience to the law, although the effect was 
somewhat indirect."' But just as importantly, individuals accept deci- 
sions that they perceived to have been procedurally fair with greater 
frequency."* Lind and Tyler concluded that when process is fair, dis- 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. LIND & TYLER, supra note 220. at 96. 
224. See id. at 66-76. The authors note that this preference may be less strong when outcomes 
are severe: a defendant facing certain execution would be less concerned with process than an 
individual facing a relatively insignificant traffic court fine. However, they cite studies suggest- 
ing the opposite is true. Thus, a study found that felony defendants' evaluation of their treatment 
by the system depended more on process than outcome (the severity of their sentences). Id. at 
73. 
225. Id. at 75. 
226. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). 
227. LIND & TYLER, supra note 220, at 76-81. 
228. Id. at 81 (summarizing individual willingness to refrain from challenging arbitration 
awards). 
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putes do not fester (and thus are not appealed).ug 
Unfortunately, arguing for a "fairness" preference is question beg- 
ging. Welfare economics, in particular, would need a more detailed 
account of what preferences individuals had for different legal proce- 
dures in different contexts. Happily, Lind and Tyler have begun this 
accounting. They explain that, in contexts as diverse as plea bargaining, 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) proceedings and jury design, indi- 
viduals prefer one particular characteristic consistently: litigant control 
over  proceeding^."^ 
However, this preference for litigant control does not, in and of it- 
self, decide the question of whether process preferences are simply de- 
rivative of self-interested outcome preferences. Lind and Tyler at- 
tempted to separate out these effects by considering individual tastes for 
presenting an argument, while detaching that effect from the outcome 
of that argument. In effect they sought to answer whether it makes peo- 
ple feel good to present an argument to a judge, even when they know 
the argument will not affect the outcome of the trial. Drawing upon a 
series of prior lab studies, Lind and Tyler concluded that procedural 
preferences do indeed reflect a strong "voice" effect.231 
First, Lind and Tyler examined an earlier study finding that indi- 
viduals who were allowed simply to discuss how decisions would be 
made (without actually having decisionmaking power) felt better about 
later outcomes arising from those discussions than individuals who were 
not allowed to discuss them."2 Of course, individuals were even more 
pleased when allowed to actually help design these decision-making 
 procedure^.^^ However, evidence that preference expression has its 
own utility supports Lind and Tyler's conception of an independent 
taste for process. 
The two authors also drew on a study by Tyler that tested the 
strength of the process-control effect by manipulating the bias, compe- 
tence and consideration of the decision-maker, and by varying the sub- 
stantiality of the outcomes involved.u4 Tyler found that the process- 
control effect disappeared only when the disputants' decision-maker 
was seen not to have listened to the disputant."' Having one's views 
considered is thus more important than having one's view prevail, at 
229. Id. at 82. 
230. Id. at 84-92. 
231. Id. at 100-05. 
232. LIND & TYLER, supra note 220, at 102 (citing L. Musante et al., The Effects of Control 
on Perceived Fairness of Procedures and Outcomes. 19 J .  EXP. SOC. PSYCH. 223 (1983)). 
233. Id. at 100-05. 
234. Id. at 104. 
235. Id. 
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least in evaluations of how fair legal procedures areeu6 
Now the simple conclusion that people experience some utility by 
either making arguments themselves, or having advocates do so for 
them, is not yet the kind of data that can be plugged easily into a wel- 
fare economic analysis. It is necessary to measure the strength of this 
preference relative to other preferences that might be served by the le- 
gal system.u7 However, if people value process as highly as Lind and 
Tyler believe that they do, then the design of legal policy must incorpo- 
rate a concern for the means by which they will be implemented, as 
well as the allocative ends to be served by the policies. And if prefer- 
ences for procedure are not just deeply held, but also widely spread, 
then ignoring them might undermine the behavior shaping premises of 
the welfare economic 
More recent research in the field has confirmed and expanded upon 
Lind's and Tyler's conclusions. Thus, a 1990 study examined what 
would happen if, after a decision had been made, informed individuals 
were simply allowed to present their arguments to the decision-maker. 
Fully aware that these arguments would have no effect, individuals al- 
lowed to speak nevertheless felt more fairly treated than those who 
were not-a pure process effect.239 Similarly, a researcher examined the 
effect of experts in courtrooms, and concluded that adversarial experts 
(as opposed to court-appointed ones) lent more legitimacy to the proc- 
ess in the eyes of the losing party.240 
The consistent message of this work is that individuals have an in- 
dependent taste for fair procedures, which is primarily defined as hav- 
ing a voice in the decision-making process. When this taste is not re- 
spected, individuals lose faith in the distributive outcomes and in the 
236. The rules of evidence, which often preclude disputants from articulating their views as 
they would like, are also structured to help some disputants (especially criminal defendants) 
prevail. Thus, to the extent that criminal defendants hold preferences about procedure that are 
similar to those of the population in general, those preferences may be in conflict with the dispu- 
tant's more immediate self-interest. See id. at 106. 
237. In Part II.C.3, infra, we discuss in more detail the legal economists' critiques of 
psychological research. Lind and Tyler do discuss this issue, concluding that the relative strength 
of procedural fairness preferences vis a vis distributionallcost concerns varies across situations, 
although usually fairness was the dominant preference. Id. at 139. 
238. In other words, if procedure influences legitimacy, which influences compliance, then 
procedure could affect individual behavior just as much as the substantive legal rules that are 
applied through procedural practices. Alternatively, if procedure influences litigation behavior 
directly (e.g.. by inducing individuals to appeal or not to appeal from legal results), then it will 
add to the social costs of litigation and thus affect the utility calculus directly. 
239. E.A. Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Non- 
instrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments. 59 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 952-59 
(1990). 
240. Robert Mark Johnstone, Perceptions of Justice: An Examination of the Effects of Type 
of Expert, Verdict, Role, and Trial Experience on Procedural Justice Judgments 50-65 (199G) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon) (on file with the Harvard Law School 
library). 
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system itself. Respecting this taste, on the other hand, can create faith 
in the system even though the procedures fail to protect disputants from 
bad outcomes.241 The empirical data supporting the Thibault-Walker- 
Lind-Tyler research should cause Kaplow and Shavell to reconsider 
their "intuition" that procedures do not matter to the populace.242 
2. Competing Explanatory Models 
We now turn to a brief explanation of what might motivate indi- 
viduals to value procedural justice, even in the face of evidence about 
its costs. There are two competing theories about why individuals ex- 
hibit tastes for certain procedures. The first, Thibault's and Walker's 
self-interest model, suggests that individuals seek control over decisions 
(through a fair process) because they want to retain an effect upon 
them.243 The second, Lind's and Tyler's group-value model, argues that 
procedure creates group identity, and violations of norms of procedure 
thus undermine self-identity.244 
These two competing theories imply different predictions about 
what .kinds of procedures individuals will prefer (and also about 
whether such preferences are internally stable or externally manipu- 
lable). The self-interest model predicts the following variables that will 
strongly influence individual's judgments about procedure: "(1) the 
favorability of the procedure to the perceiver, (2) the amount of control 
over outcomes afforded the perceiver, (3) the fairness of the outcomes 
provided by the procedure, and (4) the consistency with which the pro- 
cedure is applied across people. "245 
On the other hand, the group-value model predicts that procedural 
preferences would vary based on the ethical characteristic of each 
group, but would generally include a preference for value expression 
and dignified treatment. Second, the group value model predicts that 
procedures will be more important for individuals who are uncertain of 
their status within society and those who are  traditionalist^.^^^ 
We find Lind and Tyler's group-value theory somewhat more plau- 
241. Lind and Tyler analyze this problem as one of "false consciousness," and they reason 
that one might cause individuals to experience utility by manipulating their procedural prefer- 
ences, even though the system is, in truth, stacked against them. LIND & TYLER, supra note 220, 
at 4. 76, 201-02. However. they note that if experimental subjects find out about this deception. 
the perceived benefits of voice and control disappear. Id. 
242. See LIND & TYLER. supra note 220, at 217 (describing how procedural preferences 
should cause law and economists tqreconsider outcome-based evaluations of utility). 
243. See THIBAULT & WALKER, supra note 213, at 120-23. But cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra 
note 3, at 1164-65 (stressing that procedural preferences should be treated as merely derivative 
of preferences for favorable outcomes). 
244. LIND &TYLER. supra note 220. at 231. 
245. Id. at 226. 
246. Id. at 238. 
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sible as an explanation of why process matters to individuals. As we 
interpret the relevant literature, we think most researchers working in 
this area would agree that as a theory it has been better at predicting the 
actual behavior of real people.247 However, there may well be a middle 
ground between the two models that would explain both why people 
care about procedure, even when it is divorced from outcome, and why 
they seem to care somewhat less about it when outcomes are unfavor- 
able.248 
3. Objections to the Procedural Preference Literature 
There have been several major strands of criticism directed at the 
procedural justice researchers. First, critics have argued that laboratory 
preferences are entirely artificial (e-g., reflecting what people believe 
to be "nice" rather than what they want).249 Second, scholars criticize 
the procedural justice literature for its inability to sharply separate pref- 
erences for procedures from preferences for desired outcomes.250 Third, 
critics have argued that, even if laboratory preference rankings are not 
artificial, they fail to convey any information about how much people 
actually value goods.251 We address each of these criticisms in turn. 
a. Are Laboratory Results Real? 
The most significant of the three criticisms is the claim that labora- 
tory results do not expose real preferences but rather pieties of fairness 
that individuals would not honor if it came to making hard tradeoffs in 
practice.252 Kaplow and Shavell contrast the procedural justice findings 
247. See id. at 239-40 (arguing for the model, but noting that differences in how people react 
to bad outcomes is not explained by theory); see also Jody Karen Clay-Werner, Perceptions of 
Gender Bias in the Legal System: A Procedural Justice Account 53-54, 75 (1997) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)) (on file with the Harvard College 
Library) (summarizing recent research and refining model); Johnstone, supra note 240, at 23-25 
(summarizing recent research). But see James Lea, Who Cares About Procedural Justice: An 
Examination of Individual Differences 136-41 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Queen's 
University) (finding, in study focusing on individual differences, that evidence for each theory 
varied based on both internal characteristics of subjects and situational characteristics of the 
experiment). 
248. LIND &TYLER, supra note 220, at 240-41 (describing potential hybrid theories). 
249. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1212 11.613; see also Chevigny, supra note 219, at 
1212. 
250. See, e.g.,  Robert M .  Hayden & Jill K. Anderson, On the Evaluation of Procedural 
Systems in Laboratory Experiments: A Critique of Thibault and Walker, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
21 (1979). 
251. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1214. 
252. Chevigny, supra note 219, at 1212 ("[S]ubjects who seem to prefer neutral procedures 
may be expressing political pieties to which they think it would be best to appear to subscribe."). 
Sometimes criticism is directed to the use of college students, who are somewhat unrepresenta- 
tive of the population at large, as experimental subjects. See Samuel R. Gross, The American 
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with polls in which individuals claim to be concerned with legal costs253 
and with the economists' own intuitions that Americans are simply ig- 
norant of legal p r o c e d ~ r e . ~ ~  They conclude that the procedural justice 
literature stemming from Thibault's work reflects simply opinions 
about policy, not tastes for procedure.255 
We agree that the issue is not concluded, but,we are skeptical about 
Kaplow's and Shavell's skepticism. The procedural justice literature has 
not yet assigned a market value to procedural preferences. Yet, unless 
that is to be made an inflexible condition of the relevance of psycho- 
logical literature, the procedural justice literature is sufficiently cor- 
roborated that legal economists ought to be troubled by it. There have 
been twenty-five years of academic research demonstrating that prefer- 
ences about procedure are ~ignificant.~'~ Moreover, in Lind's and Ty- 
ler's work (and in the work of later supporting authors), real-world 
tests of these procedures have confirmed the existence of significant 
preferences for p r o c e d ~ r e . ~ ~  Simply saying that laboratory work has no 
explanatory power seems, in the words of Lind and Tyler, a "spurious" 
response for fellow social scientists to make.258 
Moreover, critics of procedural preferences, such as Kaplow and 
Shavell, do not offer compelling evidence demonstrating that they are 
laboratory artifacts. They assert that procedural preferences are out- 
come dependent because successful parties do not care about unfair 
 procedure^.^^ The published evidence suggests otherwise.260 In addi- 
tion, the preferences of individual litigants are not the only preferences 
that are relevant to the design of welfare-maximizing legal proce- 
dure~.'~' Kaplow and Shavell point to a plank of the Republican Party's 
1994 political platform, the Contract With America, and suggest that it 
demonstrates that citizens (or perhaps only Republican voters) do not 
Advantage: The Value of Ineflicient Litigation, 85 MIcH. L. REV. 734, 740 n.22 (1987). 
253. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1214 n.614. 
254. Id. at 1164-65. 
255. Id. at 1214. 
256. Lea, supra note 247, at 12-18. 
257. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & R. Folger, Distributional and Procedural Aspects of Satisfac- 
tion with Citizen-Police Encounters, 1 BASIC AND APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 281-92 (1980); see 
also LIND & TYLER. supra note 220, at 48-57 (discussing field studies). Cf. Chevigny, supra 
note 219, at 1212 (concluding that "[tlhere is enough evidencen to support Lind and Tyler's 
experimental data). 
258. LIND & TYLER, supra note 220. at 43. 
259. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3. at 1215. 
260. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 220, at 67-73 (discussing the effect of procedure on 
positive outcomes and concluding that individual's preference for fair procedures is present, 
though attenuated, even when people win at trial). 
261. This is so because it is possible that all members of society would be willing to pay a 
certain amount (or would pay that amount if they had funds equal to others) to ensure that proce- 
dures remained fair. Thus, although individual litigants might prefer not to have a jury trial in 
the individual case, the preferences of society as a whole might require it as an option. 
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have tastes for procedural justice.262 We are unconvinced that such a 
promise, never enacted into and part of a platform largely modi- 
fied and rejected,'@ is sufficient evidence against the appeal of proce- 
dural fairness. 
Finally, even if it were true that successful litigants do not care 
about procedure, and that the public in general had expressed no tastes 
for it, the preferences of unsuccessful litigants would remain, and these 
should be significant to welfare economists who are committed to count 
all preferences. The clear message of the procedural justice literature is 
that unsuccessful litigants are more satisfied with legal institutions, are 
less likely to appeal decisions, are more satisfied with outcomes, and 
are generally happier when they have some control over procedures 
than when they do not.265 Criticism of the procedural justice literature 
that does not consider these findings is inconclusive. 
b. Is the Procedural Preference Literature Methodologi- 
cally Flawed? 
Some criticisms of the procedural justice literature single it out as 
especially flawed because of its inability to separate outcome- 
preferences reliably from procedural ones.266 Indeed, Lind and Tyler 
themselves explicitly point out this methodological problem in previous 
research.267 There are reasons to believe that Lind and Tyler's school of 
procedural justice research has begun to design experiments that can 
separate outcome preferences from procedure preferences. 
c. Do Procedural Preferences Convey Relevant Welfare 
Information ? 
A third criticism of procedural preferences is that they do not con- 
262. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3. at 1214 n.614. 
263. Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, A Profile of Tort Litigation in Georgia and 
Reflections on Tort Reform, 30 GA. L. REV. 627. 629 n.2 (1996) (reviewing legislative history of 
federal bill and noting that it was vetoed by President Clinton). 
264. GOP Marks Contracts Anniversary, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 28, 1997, at 8A 
("Although much of the Contract With America had been enacted, some has passed in heavily 
modified forms, and at least one major element-term limits for members of Congress-was 
rejected."). 
265. See infra Part II.C.l and notes therein; see also Chevigny, supra note 219, at 1217. 
266. Con~pare Vladimir J. Konecni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, External Validity of Research in 
Legal Psychology, 3 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 39 (1979) (discussing problems with laboratory 
psychology generally) with Hayden & Anderson, supra note 250 (critiquing Thibault and 
Walker's work). 
267. LIND & TYLER. Supra note 220. at 129-45 (discussing experiments attempting to isolate 
the difference). 
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vey information in a form usable by economists.268 This criticism re- 
duces to a demand for dollars: how much will people be willing to pay 
to satisfy their supposed tastes for fairness in procedure?269 
We agree with this criticism in one sense: it rightly points out that 
the procedural justice literature does not ask individuals to balance the 
costs of implementing procedures against the benefits of satisfying pref- 
erences. It is thus difficult to tell exactly how much individuals value 
the voice and fairness effects discussed above. We endorse welfare 
economists' call for more experimental data about procedural prefer- 
e n c e ~ . ~ ~ ~  
However, we note that simply using willingness to pay as a measure 
of utility (or disutility) is not consistent with the moral theories of well- 
being that Kaplow and Shavell and other contemporary theorists en- 
dorse. Simply asking people how much they will pay for procedure 
could conceivably omit important distributional and psychological in- 
formation relevant to the encompassing "well-being" norm endorsed by 
Kaplow and Sha~e11.~~'  In other words, some sort of non-market correc- 
tion will probably have to be applied to the market data in any event. 
Furthermore, we suspect that any evidence of procedural prefer- 
ences that is likely to appear in the future will not take the form of ac- 
tual market transactions. Considerable inference and extrapolation will 
be required in order to assign a number value to preferences. Official 
legal procedures are not priced on a competitive market like television 
sets. Kaplow and Shavell discuss the common use of alternative dispute 
resolution procedures, but recognize that they are not decisive evidence 
against procedural preferences.272 They imagine hypothetical legislation 
that might set a "price tag" on procedural preferences, thus permitting 
a form of direct measurement of procedural preferences." However, 
barring some unanticipated legislative reforms, that experiment would 
also have to be conducted in a laboratory setting, or by polling indi- 
viduals about their preferences. If those results suggested strong prefer- 
ences, would welfare economists then impugn the poll data as mere 
268. Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 3, at 1212 n.Gl3 ("The basic problem is that most prior 
empirical work does not seem to have been designed in a manner that could identify or quantify 
actual tastes for procedures."). That is, most of the procedural preference literature falls into the 
category that Hovenkamp describes as "'subjective' information about preference[s]." rather than 
the "revealed market preference" that economists know how to work with. Hovenkamp, supra 
note 121. at 37. 
269. Kaplow and Shavell offer a hypothetical designed to expose this very quantity, and be- 
lieve that it would prove their point about the relative worthlessness of procedural tastes. Kaplow 
& Shavell. supra note 3, at 1216. 
270. For a critique of such work into "revealed preferences," see id. at 55-59. 
271. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text. 
272. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1216. 
273. See id. 
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artifacts? This could have serious theoretical consequences. For exam- 
ple, the law and economics commentators discussed in Part I agree that 
it is morally necessary, when performing economic analysis of law, to 
use practical procedures that compensate for distributive effects in or- 
der to make valid interpersonal utility comparisons possible. How are 
analysts in other contexts going to gauge variations in the marginal util- 
ity of income without using poll data, or something equally speculative? 
We simply mean to emphasize that there is a limit to the extent to 
which Kaplow, Shavell, and the other new legal economists can be par- 
simonious about admitting experimental data of preferences that are not 
in the form of market prices, and yet still claim to have rejected crude 
theories of wealth maximization. 
The challenge for experimental research is clear. There is a need 
for experiments that attempt to separate what is an expression of a "pi- 
ety" from what is a genuine procedural taste-in other words, a need to 
force people to make relatively hard choices-preferably against a 
wealth-neutral backdrop such as a hypothetical standardized budget-so 
that we can be sure that their preferences are just that. Our intuition is 
that the procedural justice literature will hold up under this pressure. If 
real preferences separate themselves from the chaff, we have argued 
that welfare economics must incorporate them into the utility calculus. 
C. Tastes for Legal Rules 
A welfare-economic analysis that did not take into account any 
preferences for specific legal rules that exist would fail to promote 
well-being, as understood by the current conceptions of welfare eco- 
n o m i c ~ . ~ ~ ~  In this section we present evidence of such preferences. We 
discuss two psychological patterns that inform people's attitudes toward 
different possible legal rules. Such preferences may be more likely to 
come into play among litigants, jurors, lawyers, and similar partici- 
pants in the legal system. Other people will often be unaware of these 
rule-pairs or fail to understand them. Even to the extent that they do 
comprehend the choice available, they might be indifferent about their 
outcome, whether because they believe the content of legal rules will 
not affect them," or that it should not.276 
In Part 1I.C. 1, we discuss two general types of preference for legal 
274. See id. at 1350. 
275. See Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEG. STUD. 
537. 543-44 (1998) (discussing the unimportance of the implied warrantylcaveat lessee pair of 
rules for individuals in the middle of a term lease). 
27G. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
6 0 4 4  (1991) (arguing that some residents of a close knit community believed that resort to the 
law violated a norm of "good neighborliness"). 
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rules: attributively fair rules; and endowment protecting ones. We then, 
in Part II.C.2, attempt to apply these general preferences to situations 
of policy choice confronted by legal economists. 
I .  Preferences for Rules 
From a merely outcome-centered welfare economic perspective, 
preferences for one legal rule, as such, over another are obstacles in the 
way to efficient legal reform. Like preferences for procedure, prefer- 
ences for rules make legal analysis based on promoting well-being more 
difficult to perform, less reliable, or both-unless those preferences are 
relatively weak or malleable. 
A developing body of psychological evidence suggests that legal 
rules reflect common sense attributions of responsibility and blame. 
That is, the perceived fairness of a legal rule depends on whether it 
comports with how individuals believe the law should attribute respon- 
sibility among different moral actors. This proposition is fleshed out in 
a forthcoming article by Jon Hanson and Ana re ye^.^^^ It is supported 
by a psychological framework known as attribution theory."' To the 
extent that Hanson and Reyes can establish clear differences in the de- 
gree of fairness that individuals perceive in different rules, their work 
will also suggest the existence of corresponding preferences for the 
rules viewed as fair. Under many theories of well-being, such prefer- 
ences must be viewed as a component of well-being. That will tend to 
contradict Kaplow and Shavell's view that legal rule preferences are of 
little significance to welfare economics.279 
Internalized tastes for fair rules are not the only tastes that weIfare 
economics must recognize. Individuals also prefer (and are in theory 
willing to pay for) legal rules that protect entitlements that they believe 
they already own.280 To the extent that individuals value rules that re- 
277. Jon D. Hanson and Ana Reyes. Attribution Theory (unpublished partial manuscript on 
file with authors). 
278. Cf. Bernard Weiner. An Attributional Theory of Achievement Motivation and Emotion, 92 
PSYCHOL. REV. 548 (1985) (providing a history of the theory). 
279. Kaplow and Shavell argue that tastes for "fairn punishments can be considered as a part 
of the utility calculus when they exist, but believe that such occasions are rare. See Kaplow & 
Shavell, supra note 3, at 1291 n.800. ("Our conjecture is that, for many violations of the law, 
individuals will not have strong independent tastes regarding the level of punishment."). 
280. Most of this literature is framed in terms of the effect of rules on how individuals value 
goods. See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer. Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to 
Accept: Legal and Economic Implications. 71 WASH. U .  L.Q. 59 (1993) (reviewing literature); 
see also Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase 
Theorem, 98 J .  POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (describing a famous experiment involving valuations of 
coffee mugs); Daniel Kahneman et al.. The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo 
Bias, 5 J. ECON PERSP. 193 (1991). However, this increase in valuation can be viewed as quanti- 
fying a taste for the type of protection that the rule offers. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest 
Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L REV. 1541 (1998) (finding 
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spect initial allocations of property entitlements over their reverses, 
these preferences would presumably be incorporated into the welfare 
calculus as well. 
Another type of rule-preference may correspond to the role of judi- 
cial precedent. We introduce this factor because behavioral psychology 
research reveals that individuals consistently prefer the current state of 
affairs to a changed one. In plain language, they (and we) have a taste 
for the status 
Evidence for this bias is varied and strong. Individuals choose to 
remain at their jobs rather than switch to other, higher paying ones.282 
They tend to keep their current phone or electrical services over new 
ones that might be more reliable.283 In the legal context, they tend to 
prefer default contract terms over new ones (even though the new ones 
might benefit them).284 
Although in some cases the disruptions from a change in law that 
violated the status quo effect would be relatively negligible, in some 
cases they are significant.285 We do not know how welfare economics 
should proceed. The only options seem to be as follows: (1) always 
ignore status quo bias effects as uninformed,286 (2) ignore status quo 
bias effects when they could be confused with other preferences whose 
effects are more easily quantified,287 (3) incorporate status quo bias ef- 
fects in every welfare calculus as a small (general) cost incurred when 
that the endowment effect occurs when goods are protected by property rules and not liability 
rules, thus property rules alone create (and are expressed by) the relevant preference). 
281. See Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 280, at 70 (discussing status quo bias); see also 
Russell B. Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power 
of Default Rules and Form Terms. 51 VAND. L REV. 1583 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin. The 
Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL . REV. 608 (1998) [hereinafter 
Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias] (results of study about contract terms). Cf. William Samuelson 
& Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 
(1988) ("Faced with new options, decisionmakers often stick with the status quo alternative."); 
see also Jonathan Baron & Joshua Greene, Determinants of Insensitivity to Quantity in Valuation 
of Public Goods: Contribution, Warm Glow, Budget Constraints, Availability, and Prominence, 2 
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. APPLIED 107, 113 (1996) (testing strength of bias in various popu- 
lations). 
282. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky. Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. 
P ~ Y C H O L O G I ~ T  341, 348 (1984). 
283. See Raymond S. Hartman et al., Consumer Rationality and the Status Quo, 106 Q.J. 
ECON. 141, 143 (1991). 
284. See Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias, supra note 281, at 646-48. 
285. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: 
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U .  L.Q. 347, 361-62 (1996) 
(discussing how status quo bias might create a preference for non-wealth maximizing standard- 
ized contracting terms even between commercial actors). 
286. Absent any real data about the informational content of preferences for legal rules, Kap- 
low and Shavell appear to take this position. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1350-55. 
287. See Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias, supra note 281, at 626 n.58 (discussing the confu- 
sion between status quo effects and endowment effects). 
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one changes rules,288 or (4) incorporate status quo bias effects on a 
case-by-case basis.289 
2. Specific Applications 
People's individual preferences for rules, their general bias for the 
status quo, and the endowment effect come together in interesting ways 
in the property rulelliability rule puzzle. The puzzle of whether prop- 
erty or liability rules most efficiently protect property rights is a central 
question of the law and economic literature, with most commentators 
arguing that liability rule protections facilitate bargaining and therefore 
maximize efficien~y.'~ 
However, in recent years, law-and-behavioralism's viral insights 
have infected even this venerable cathedral of the law and economic 
debate.291 One key insight is that initial ownership of a property right 
makes individuals even less willing to bargain it away.'% A few legal 
economists, including Kaplow and Shavell, have responded that this 
evidence provides an "unclear and unhelpful" guide to analysis.293 
Most, however, have grappled with the exact content of the data, ques- 
288. Empirical researchers would presumably establish the social costs of changing rules in a 
general case by averaging highly publicized and lowly publicized changes together. 
289. Thus, overturning Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), might create a higher status-quo 
bias cost than overruling United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). which is a decision of 
comparable legal importance, but one less likely to have penetrated the public consciousness. 
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (arguing that 
certain socially momentous legal decisions are entitled to special precedential force). 
290. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In- 
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (reasoning that liability 
rules are more likely to encourage bargaining when transactions costs are high); see also Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis. 109 
HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996) (arguing that liability rules are almost always appropriate). Cf. James 
E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another 
Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (1995) (suggesting that dispositive resolution of the dilemma is 
impossible). 
291. See Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 280; cf. Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future 
Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1777-81 (1998) (arguing that 
presence of endowment effect makes normative policy analyses impossible absent further re- 
search). 
292. See Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 3; see also Daniel Kahneman et al., supra note 280. 
293. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 745-48. Kaplow and Shavell divide their argument 
against the usefulness of entitlement psychology into three parts. First, they point out that allo- 
cating a property rule to one party means not allocating it to another-a preference for property 
rules can not inform who should receive the initial entitlement. Id. Second, they point out that to 
the extent that initial allocation has created a bond, its breaking can be analyzed in utilitarian 
ways. Id. To us, this means that the strength of the attachment created by property rules (which, 
as we have shown, can be quite strong), will be considered when deciding whether a liability rule 
would be more appropriate. They finally dismiss claims about natural entitlements and distribu- 
tive justice as circular and lacking in conceptual content, respectively. Id. We do not believe that 
Kaplow and Shavell have responded to the real point of the behavioralist literature, namely that 
individuals might have a preference for property rules qua property rules, and might have a 
preference for the status quo qua status quo. 
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tioning whether the effect is a preference for property rules over liabil- 
ity rules, or a preference for the status quo.294 There are a few writers 
of this latter group who believe that individuals exhibit a real prefer- 
ence for property rules, and warn against attempts to "tinker" with it."' 
The mainstream academic consensus, however, still tends to favor the 
liability rule protection of initial entitlements, which appears to reduce 
the endowment 
Translating this literature to our concerns, we see that welfare eco- 
nomics has seriously complicated the already puzzled propertylliability 
rule puzzle. People's preferences for legal rules (whether informed by 
fairness, ownership made venerable by endowment, or even the status 
quo) make it difficult to recommend adopting a legal regime that is oth- 
erwise believed to be efficient (liability rule protection for most prop- 
erty rights). Moreover, this specific application seems susceptible to 
broad generalizations. It therefore makes us wonder when, if ever, wel- 
fare economics will be able to boldly call for legal change. The tension 
between the status quo and change is omnipresent, as is (to a lesser 
extent) the preference creating endowment effect. 
D. (Dis)fasfes for Economic Decision Making 
The material in the preceding two sections may not have surprised 
the informed reader. The idea that ordinary people prefer fair solutions 
to legal problems is obvious. However, welfare economics contains 
.within itself an emergent tension to which it may be difficult to re- 
s p ~ n d . ~ ~ ~  Some recent experiments sharply suggest that people may not 
want policymakers to use economic, preference-based decision-making 
to choose between competing legal practices in their community. 
The experiments we will discuss are particularly notable because 
they closely simulate actual legal deliberation, and the participants are 
specifically asked to assign dollar values. This experimental data is thus 
better suited to meet Kaplow and Shavell's strictures than the data of 
preferences for procedural justice considered in Part 1I.B. It suggests 
294. See Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 280, at 1572-74. 
295. Id. at 1575-76; cf. Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 
Protect Where the Wild Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-olinks, and Other Things That Go Bump 
in the Night, 85 IOWA L. REV. 849, 899, n.219 (2000) (discussing Rachlinski and Jourden). 
296. See Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 280, at 1575. 
297. A familiar variant of utilitarian theory known as "rule-utilitarianism" attempts to resolve 
the practical difficulties of implementing utilitarianism by holding that the analyst's job is simply 
to identify the general rule that will tend, on the whole, to maximize welfare to a greater degree 
than other competing rules of similar generality. Kaplow and Shave11 frequently express views 
similar to rule-utilitarianism. We note, however, that identifying the "best" legal rule under rule- 
utilitarianism depends in part upon aggregating the net welfare effects of that rule across a range 
of individual situations when the rule is likely to be applied. Assessing those individual situa- 
tions, in turn, may involve the same types of difficult calculations previously discussed. 
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that individuals are "actually . . . willing in principle to expend re- 
sources to benefit from" law-related  preference^.^" People, it seems, do 
not like economists to make their legal decisions for them.299 These 
preferences, unlike those we have previously discussed, are specifically 
concerned with the absence or presence in the legal system of numeri- 
cal, consequentialist decision-making procedures like the ones sup- 
ported by Kaplow and Shavell and others. We therefore dub them "anti- 
utilitarian preferences. " 
In the following section, we review the works of three prominent 
scholars who have performed empirical work teasing out the strength of 
anti-utilitarian preferences. Then, in Part III.E, we attempt to explain 
when these preferences arise, and articulate why welfare economics 
ought to respect them. 
I .  W. Kip Viscusi and the Anti- Utilitarian Jury 
W. Kip Viscusi is one of the most prominent defenders of economic 
decision-making. He believes that "we all benefit" when textbook cost- 
benefit analyses are performed by corporate decision-makers.300 He has 
argued that regulatory agencies act inefficiently if they do not base their 
decisions on such trade off^,^" and that such failures disproportionately 
harm racial minorities.302 Viscusi strongly encourages legal scholars to 
use cost-benefit based decision-making to analyze legal rules and insti- 
tutions of all kinds.303 He thinks individuals perform cost-benefit analy- 
298. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1211. 
299. Cf. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958). Hand states: 
For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, 
even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not. If they were in' 
charge. I should miss the stimulus of living in a society where I have, at least theo- 
retically, some part in the direction of public affairs. 
Id. 
300. See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act? 52 STAN. L. REV. 547, 
550 (2000). 
301. See W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U .  CHI. L. REV. 1423, 1436-37 
(1996) (arguing that agencies should be bound by the "intuitively appealing" "benefit-cost" test). 
302. See W. Kip Viscusi. Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843 (2000) (arguing that cost- 
benefit decisionmaking by administrative agencies empowers minorities). 
303. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in 
Environmental and Safery Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285 (1998) (applying cost-benefit analysis to 
punitive damages); see also W. Kip Viscusi, Why There Is No Defense of Punitive Damages, 87 
GEO. L.J. 381. 395 (1998) (arguing that legal analyses which do not employ cost-benefit analysis 
are not constructive). Cf. W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: 
An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1437 (1994) (analyzing intersection of regulation and tort law through cost-benefit lens). See also 
W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rarionaliry, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations of Tort Law. 48 
RUTGERS L. REV. 625. 667 (1995) (applying cost-benefit analysis to warning label law); cf. 
James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Benefits and Costs of Regulatory Reforms for Super- 
fund, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 159 (1997) (applying cost-benefit analysis to EPA's Superfund 
program). 
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ses all the time.304 He seems to favor cost-benefit decision-making by 
 judge^,^" and he also believes that juries should regularly perform cost- 
benefit analyses.306 
In light of Viscusi's staunch belief in the desirability of economic 
decision-making in the legal system, one of the most striking leitmotifs 
in his work is his consistent acknowledgment thateaverage individuals 
find cost-benefit analysis in tort cases severely distasteful. Thus, he 
offers evidence that others have called his own economic analyses of 
safety issues "an offense to human decency."307 He recognizes that cor- 
porations have had a great deal of trouble articulating their cost-benefit 
decision-making persuasively to the publi~.~'' Indeed, he has begun to 
suspect that individuals have an "ingrained hostility towards rational, 
mathematical analyses of benefits and costs in the domain of risk,"309 
and argues for framing economic analysis in ways that might ameliorate 
this hostility.310 
Confronted with this tension, Professor Viscusi decided recently to 
test exactly how citizens feel about cost-benefit decision-making in the 
legal system.311 He asked how potential jurors reacted to corporate risk 
balancing when that balancing led to a decision to market a product 
containing a defect that had killed someone.312 Viscusi presented mock 
jurors with five different accident scenarios.313 In the first two scenar- 
ios, the corporation had performed no cost-benefit analysis, but the cost 
304. See Mark K. Dreyfus & W. Kip Viscusi, Rates of Time Preference and Consumer Valua- 
.tions of Automobile Safety and Fuel Efficiency, 38 J.L. & E c o N .  79 (arguing that consumers 
effectively use cost-benefit analysis in making the costlsafety tradeoff while buying a car). 
305. W. Kip Viscusi, Regulatory Economics in the Courts: An Analysis of Judge Scalia's 
NHTSA Bumper Decision, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1987, at 17 (praising Antonin 
Scalia for using cost-benefit decision making while analyzing agency decisions). Viscusi noted 
that the "benefit-cost test should be regarded as a tool of advocacy not entirely different from 
noneconomic arguments that can be mustered in support of a policy." Id. at 24. 
306. Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as a 
Risk Manager. 40 ARK. L. REV. 901. 913 (1998) ("Ideally, the jury in its role as a risk manager 
should promote the rational analyses of risk and safety by the parties who may end up in litiga- 
tion following adverse events. More specifically, the objective should be to maintain a sensible 
benefit-cost tradeoff.") 
307. See Viscusi, supra note 300, at 550 n.5 (citing an opposing brief in litigation). 
308. See id. at 567-86 (providing examples of companies that performed cost-benefit analyses 
being forced to pay large punitive damage awards); see also W. Kip Viscusi, The Governmental 
Composition of the Insurance Costs of Smoking, 42 J.L. & ECON. 575, 605 (1999) (asserting that 
making cost-benefit arguments is "uncomfortable"); Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Dam- 
ages Against Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, supra note 303, at 321 (asserting 
that making such calculations may offend some jurors' sensitivities). 
309. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 306, at 913. 
310. W. Kip Viscusi, Equivalent Frames of Reference for Judging Risk Regulation Policies. 3 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 431 (1995) (arguing for a new framework that would allow cost-benefit 
decision making to be publicly accepted). 
311. See Viscusi, supra note 300 (reporting and analyzing his "juror judgement survey"). 
312. Viscusi apparently believes that the very existence of a properly performed cost-benefit 
analysis should not be evidence of non-negligence. See id. at 550. 
313. Id. at 592. 
20021 Law and Economics 397 
to make the improvement varied.314 In the third and fourth scenarios, 
the corporationhad performed an analysis, but employed significantly 
different monetary valuations of human life.315 In the fifth scenario, the 
corporation had made a mistaken calculation while applying various 
valuations of life.316 
Professor Viscusi found that, even absent a cost-benefit analysis, in- 
dividuals were willing to punish the company in his hypothetical sce- 
narios with punitive damages in eighty-eight percent of the cases.317 
But, in the latter three scenarios, when the analyses had been performed 
correctly, individuals were willing to award punitive damages ninety- 
three to ninety-five percent of the time.318 This difference is statistically 
~ igni f ican t ,~ '~  but small enough that Viscusi's most interesting results 
came from varying the damage estimates employed in the cost-benefit 
analyses. 
Absent a cost-benefit analysis, individuals imposed an average of 
$2.91 million in punitive damages.320 But when companies employed 
cost-benefit decision-making, they were penalized $4.59 million-fifty 
percent more.321 Valuing human life at higher numbers only seemed to 
increase the juror's ire (a product of a psychological anchoring effect, 
Viscusi  argue^),^" and incorrect cost-benefit analyses were (counter- 
intuitively) less repellant to jurors than their well-performed counter- 
p a r t ~ . ~ ~  Professor Viscusi finally compensated for various demographic 
and statistical factors represented in his pool of subjects.324 He con- 
cluded that attempting to justify a legally relevant decision by cost- 
benefit analysis increased the risk of punitive damages by five percent 
and the punitive damages awarded by forty-seven per~ent.~" 
Professor Viscusi found these results upsetting, to say the least. Al- 
though he realizes that "[e]conomic analysis . . . is inherently unpleas- 
ant and may offend jurors,"326 he believes that it is a simple "mis- 
taken3" for jurors to punish corporations for their systematic and so- 
cially beneficial thinking about risk.328 
Id. 
Id. 
Viscusi, supra note 300, at 592. 
Id. at 556. 
Id. at 556-57. 
Id. at 557. 
Median value: $1 million. Id. at 557. 
Median value: $10 million. Viscusi, supra note 300, at 557. 
Id. at 558. 
See id. at 559. 
Id. 
Id. 
Viscusi, supra note 300, at 566. 
Id. at 586. 
See id. at 590. 
398 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 53:2:335 
It is unclear what Professor Viscusi believes to be the cause of this 
aversion to utilitarian thinking. He discusses various biases (including 
hindsight bias) that undermine individuals' abilities to think rationally 
about risk-benefit decisions after an accident has occurred.329 He gives 
examples of these biases being applied in a variety of historical trials 
that produced large punitive awards.330 And yet his results also clearly 
demonstrate that citizens exhibit non-random,331 coherent preferences 
against utilitarian (or "cold-blooded")332 decision-making heuristics by 
actors in the legal system.333 
2. Cass Suns t e in ,  and the Anti-Utilitarian Law Students 
Cass Sunstein is another supporter of cost-benefit based legal deci- 
sion-making, although his view is more nuanced than Professor Vis- 
c ~ s i ' s . ~ ~ ~  In a recent paper,335 Sunstein and two co-authors questioned 
whether one instance of such decision-making, setting punitive damages 
according to a consequentialist model designed by Professors Polinsky 
and ~ h a v e 1 1 , ~ ~ ~  has any support among the citizenry. They concluded 
that "the public will be skeptical of an effort" to incorporate the 
Polinsky-Shave11 model of optimal deterrence in the legal system and 
"[aln attempt to move policy in this direction could be widely perceived 
as unfair and wrong. "337 
Before arriving at this disheartening (from a welfare economic per- 
spective) conclusion, Sunstein and his co-authors engaged in a series of 
.experiments designed to test whether people "believe in optimal deter- 
329. See id. at 586-90. Professor Viscusi is not the only author who believes that cognitive 
failures, rather than anti-utilitarian tastes or social norms, are the source of damage awards that 
punish cost-benefit analyses. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski. Doctrinal Col- 
lapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn. 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 296- 
303 (1990) (arguing that juries are generally incapable of accurately measuring the marginal 
costs and benefits of adding new warnings). 
330. See Viscusi, supra note 300, at 567-86. 
331. See id. at 586-90. 
332. See id. 
333. If cognitive biases were the only operative factor, Professor Viscusi's results would not 
all point in the same direction. See Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously (I). supra 
note 123, at 722-25 (noting the indeterminacy of research on the 'direction' or 'tendencies' of 
common cognitive biases). 
334. Compare Cass R. Sunstein. Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS, supra note 3 (noting that cost-benefit serves as institutional safeguard against popular 
prejudice and cognitive biases), with Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empiri- 
cally?, 66 U .  CHI. L. REV. 636, 642 n.25 (1999) (noting that while most people agree that cost- 
benefit analysis makes sense, its specific definition may either command support or create revul- 
sion). See also Richard H .  Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U .  
CHI. L. REV. 1. 43-72 (1995) (critiquing conventional cost-benefit analysis for focusing too 
narrowly on immediate ends and means). 
335. See Sunstein, Schkade, & Kahneman, supra note 5. 
336. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 29. 
337. Sunstein, Schkade, & Kahneman, supra note 5, at 250. 
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rence. "338 According to the Polinsky-Shave11 model, optimal deterrence 
occurs when jurors are asked to determine punitive damages by multi- 
plying the inverse of the probability of detection of the tortfeasor's ac- 
tions by the amount of the compensatory award that would compensate 
the victim's loss.339 
Plainly the "optimal deterrence" model of punitive damages is a 
utilitarian, cost-benefit based decision heuristic. The Polinsky-Shave11 
article notes that punitive damages are also used to further the aim of 
punishment, but its analysis largely omits that aim.340 Polinsky and 
Shavell conceive of the aim of punishment as promoting "the pleasure 
or satisfaction people obtain from seeing blameworthy parties pun- 
i ~ h e d " ~ ~ '  or the satisfaction of "an abstract philosophical principle call- 
ing for retribution."342 Both of these goods are similar to the "tastes for 
fairness" that serve as a brake on welfare analysis in the monograph of 
Kaplow and Shavell. In a sense, the pure optimal deterrence model de- 
rived from the work of Polinsky and Shavell may be thought of as an 
attempt to conceptualize a role for punitive damages to serve in the ab- 
sence of tastes for fairness. 
To investigate the acceptability of this model, Sunstein and his co- 
authors performed two experiments.343 In the first, they asked 699 citi- 
zens to judge mock personal injury cases and determine whether the 
probability of detection of the tortious conduct should affect the damage 
award.344 The likelihood that the wrongdoer would be caught was varied 
from twenty percent, to ten percent, to one percent in different sam- 
p l e ~ . ~ ~ '  Their basic result was "striking and simple."346 Even varying 
the probability of detection by twenty-fold had no significant effect on 
the amount of the punitive award the would-be jurors offered.347 Indeed, 
the effect went in an opposite direction-greater probabilities of detec- 
tion engendered larger 
However, the authors acknowledge that their initial study subjects 
may not have been sufficiently exposed to, or educated about, the value 
of cost-benefit thinking.349 They therefore turned to a new pool of sub- 
jects, closer to home, who would seemingly be uniquely willing and 
338. Id. at 239; see Polinsky & Shavell. supra note 29. 
339. Id. at 238. 
340. Polinsky & Shavell. supra note 29. 
341. Id. at 948. 
342. Id. at 948 n.252. 
343. Sunstein. Schkade, & Kahneman. supra note 5. at 239-40. 
344. Id. at 241-43. 
345. Id. at 241. 
346. Id. at 243. 
347. Id. 
348. Sunstein. Schkade. & Kahneman, supra note 5, at 243-44. 
349. Id. at 244. 
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able to apply utilitarian decision-making in legal settings-second-year 
and third-year law students at the University of Chicago.350 
The study asked whether, in two different fact situations, a specifi- 
cally articulated optimal deterrence policy was appr~pr ia te .~~ '  Sunstein 
and his co-authors sadly report that even the law students, by very 
strong majorities,352 rejected policies that maximized deterrence. More- 
over, most of the law students believed that the rest of society would 
agree with them.353 Sunstein and his co-authors conclude that "[tlhe fact 
that optimal deterrence policies are rejected in both the administrative 
and the judicial domains among a group likely to be predisposed in 
their favor strongly suggests that any effort to move in the direction of 
optimal deterrence would encounter significant popular resistance. "354 
They argue that this result confirms "messy" real world evidence tend- 
ing to show that "juries do not pursue optimal deterrence. "355 
Without this study, it would be possible to imagine that the rejec- 
tion of optimal deterrence by juries arises from their cognitive biases 
and general irrationality, rather than a substantive view of what the 
legal system should be.356 However, even University of Chicago law 
students, conditioned and requested to apply the use of this form of 
cost-benefit decision-making to hypothetical tort disputes, refused by 
overwhelming margins. Sunstein and his co-authors thus conclude that 
reforming the legal system to optimize deterrence faces severe hurdles. 
Juries may nullify their instructions.357 Individuals will widely perceive 
policies to be "unfair and wrong."358 In a remarkable passage, Sunstein 
and co-authors speculate that the government may need to adopt various 
paternalistic policies if it wishes to pursue normative proposals based 
on optimal deterrence. Government may need to conceal its true deci- 
sion-making norm from citizens,359 re-educate them about its wisdom,360 
350. Id. "University of Chicago Law School students generally learn a great deal about deter- 
rence theory in their first year of law school . . . [this] training . . . alerts [them of the need] to 
consider both level and probability of penalty in achieving optimal deterrence." Id. 
351. Students were given a recommendation that they should apply optimal deterrence deci- 
sion making, and asked whether they strongly agreed, somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed, or 
strongly disagreed with the statement. Id. at 245. 
352. Sunstein, Schkade, & Kahneman, supra note 5, at 246. Optimal deterrence policies were 
rejected by eighty-four percent of the law students in one setting and seventy-five percent in 
another. 
353. Sixty-seven to eighty-seven percent thought that "most people" would reject the optimal 
deterrence approach. Id. at 246. 
354. Id. at 248. 
355. Id. at 249. 
356. Cf. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra 
note 3, at 223. 
357. See Sunstein, Schkade, and Kahneman, supra note 5, at 250. 
358. Id. 
359. See id. For a longer discussion of this option, see infra Part 1II.A. 
360. See Sustein, Schkade, & Kahneman, supra note 5, at 250. 
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confine optimal-deterrence decision making to limited contexts,361 or 
shift authority from the legal system to b u r e a u ~ r a c i e s . ~ ~ ~  It would seem 
that only by shifting power from the people can the government be free. 
Then, "whatever ordinary people think, the relevant administrators will 
seek to promote optimal deterrence. "363 
3. W. Kip Viscusi Returns with Yet More Bad News 
Professor Viscusi has recently responded to Sunstein's anti- 
deterrence paper with an empirical study of his own3@ Although he 
describes the experiments by Sunstein and others as "carefully con- 
trolled,"3G he nevertheless believes that they did not test citizens' will- 
ingness to apply utilitarian reasoning with enough specificity. He there- 
fore devised an experiment directly testing whether individuals would 
apply the Polinsky-Shave11 punitive damages 
Viscusi instructed individuals to perform three calculations before 
selecting a punitive damage award. First, they were instructed to set the 
award that would be appropriate from a pure deterrence perspective. 
That number, they were told, should equal the level of damages (the 
compensatory judgment) divided by the probability of detection.367 Sec- 
ond, they were told to think about what level of damages was necessary 
to punish corporate wrongdoing,368 but were instructed that such pun- 
ishment may occur through the compensatory (and not the punitive) 
damage scheme.369 Third, they were told to compute a weighted average 
of the first two numbers to find the optimal punitive award. In Viscusi's 
view, this "precise guide" should have corrected for various cognitive 
biases that affect Viscusi predicted that his step-by-step dam- 
ages-setting procedure would reduce punitive damages 
Professor Viscusi gave each model jury these instructions, and then 
one of five factual  scenario^.^" The scenarios were designed to vary the 
amount of the concealment of wrongdoing by the corporate tortfeasors, 
and the corresponding likelihood that the tortious conduct would be 
dete~ted.~" Viscusi also tried to alter the anchoring effects created by 
361. See id. 
362. See id. 
363. Id. We discuss this solution infra Part 1II.B. 
364. See Viscusi. supra note 4. 
365. Id. at 314. 
366. These instructions appear in an appendix to Viscusi's paper. See id. at 344-46. 
367. See Polinsky & Shavell. supra note 29. at 889 (describing the procedure). 
368. A notion with no counterpart in consequentialist legal theories. 
369. See Viscusi. supra note 4. at 345. 
370. See id. at 318-19. 
371. See id. 
372. Id. at 346-49. 
373. In some cases the tortfeasors openly poisoned the environment, knowing that seventy- 
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party attorneys or external sources, hoping to determine whether the 
Polinsky-Shave11 optimal-deterrence proposal is 
The results were discouraging. Viscusi found that, on average, only 
fifteen percent of respondents would correctly apply the Polinsky- 
Shavell calculus.375 "Quite simply," he says, individuals "ignore the 
guidance of the deterrence table and [do not take] into account the dif- 
fering value of the detection probability when setting the optimal deter- 
rence amount."376 The amount of money that individuals believed nec- 
essary to punish corporations proved far more significant to determin- 
ing the amount of their final damage award than did their view of the 
deterrence test.3n 
Viscusi proposes two different explanations for his results. First, he 
suggests that low education may have prevented some juries from being 
able to make the necessary deterrence calculations.378 This dovetails 
with Viscusi's conclusions in earlier work about the effect of cognitive 
biases on the ability of individuals to measure risk.379 However, Viscusi 
concludes that education alone does not explain individuals' unwilling- 
ness or inability to apply the utilitarian formula offered to them. In 
fact, the responses differed significantly among ethnic and gender lines: 
minority status and gender were the two most significant determinants 
of whether an individual would apply the instructions.380 Sixty-two per- 
cent of those giving incorrect or missing answers were female.381 Sim- 
ply being a woman apparently makes you five percent less likely to 
apply Polinsky's and Shavell's utilitarian deterrence formula.382 Sugges- 
tively, Professor Viscusi concludes that while this failure may reflect 
lower mathematical skills among women, it may also reflect "a greater 
reluctance by female respondents to surrender their punitive damages 
judgment to a mathematical formula. "383 
Members of minority groups were even more hostile to the 
Polinsky-Shave11 formula. Black respondents were eleven percent less 
likely than whites to give the "correct" deterrence maximizing 
Hispanic respondents also rejected Polinsky and Shavell at a rate eight 
five percent of the time they would not be caught; in other cases they did so at midnight. See id. 
at 320-21. 
374. See Viscusi, supra note 4, at 319. 
375. See id. at 326. 
376. Id. at 329. 
377. See id. at 333. 
378. See id. at 338. 
379. See supra text accompanying notes 348-349. 
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percent higher than whites.385 
Thus, two characteristics: being educated, and being a white male, 
were the only ones positively correlated with a willingness to apply a 
pure deterrence formula in a toxic tort case. In light of this study, Vis- 
cusi concludes that attempts to reform tort damages will fail as long as 
individual citizens retain control over the process.386 He echoes his ear- 
lier call for removing legal cases from the hands of citizens, who are 
"simply reluctant or unable to carry out even the most basic mathemati- 
cal calculations. "387 
Sunstein's and Viscusi's research implies that Polinsky's and Shav- 
ell's optimal deterrence model of tort damages provokes fierce distaste 
among those exposed to it, to the point of prompting widespread nulli- 
fication and disobedience. To revert to our prior metaphor, it is clear 
that law-related preferences will act as a powerful stumbling block to 
any attempt to implement such a policy in a jury system: the jurors will 
not obey.388 The results of Sunstein's survey of law students suggests 
that even bureaucrats may defect. 
What about the direct welfare effects of such a policy? That is, sup- 
pose that the Polinsky-Shave11 damages model is welfare-maximizing in 
allocative terms. Suppose further that someone can be found to imple- 
ment it (which seems doubtful). Then to what degree will the frustra- 
tion of the law-related preferences disclosed by the two studies act as a 
"brake" on the welfare gains associated with the policy? Again, unless 
one dogmatically excludes as irrelevant all preference information that 
is not readily monetized, the reality of the preferences disclosed in the 
punitive damages studies is clear, especially as results of social science 
research go. On the other hand, their magnitude is totally unclear. 
Economists who urge the need for tort reform rightly point out the huge 
dollar values involved in punitive damage awards: if these awards are 
consistently wrong from the standpoint of welfare (excluding law- 
related preferences), and the losses do not somehow cancel each other 
out, then the welfare loss produced is likely to be very serious. Such 
losses would be serious enough to swamp even large welfare gains that 
resulted from respecting the desires of average people for a non- 
utilitarian, fairness-based system of assigning punitive damages. The 
385. See Viscusi, supra note 4, at 338. 
386. See id. at 344. 
387. Id. This statement is not entirely supported by the rest of Professor Viscusi's paper. 
Individuals were able to average the amounts they awarded for deterrence and those they 
awarded for punishment. In over seventy-five percent of the cases, they did so correctly. See id. 
at 326. That suggests that, as with (presumably) the Chicago law students, the salient trait of 
Viscusi's non-lawyer subjects was not an inability to compute, but rather a reluctance to choose 
an amount that would correlate to the mathematically determined optimal deterrence number. 
Indeed. Viscusi acknowledges this possibility himself. See id. at 338-39. 
388. See Viscusi, supra note 4, at 326. 
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answer must await more empirical inquiry. One crucial consideration 
will be determining whether these preferences are produced, and hence 
satisfied or frustrated, only when individuals are in a jury room, or 
otherwise directly exposed to the workings of the tort system, or 
whether a more widespread disappointment would be involved. Again, 
we discuss this limitation in Part 1I.E below. 
A second important question that remains open about these studies 
is whether other welfare-economic proposals for reforming tort dam- 
ages will produce the same negative reactions that the optimal- 
deterrence model does. The vehemence may simply reflect a flaw in 
Polinsky's and Shavell's model. That model seems custom-designed to 
inflame law-related preferences and tastes for fairness in general to a 
high degree, especially when presented in a "pure" form that does not 
permit juries to assign damages for punishment. (Recall that Polinsky 
and Shavell's model instructions do authorize the jury to punish.)389 The 
model first tells jurors to assess "punitive damages," and then orders 
them to apply a procedure that seems to flout or ignore the fairness- 
based and retributive norms that distinguish punitive damages from 
normal tort damages. For example, the welfare losses from simply 
abolishing punitive damages, ordering juries merely to compensate, 
might be smaller, and might provoke less nullification. Or maybe not. 
Again, this question is open for future study. 
4. Jonathan Baron, and the Need for Education 
Psychologist Jonathan Baron's research concentrates on the "every- 
day intuitions that stand in the way of utility maximization, particularly 
moral intuitions. "390 Baron believes that consequentialism should be 
preferred as a decision heuristic over intuitive alternatives such as 
common notions of fairness.391 However, much of his scholarship is 
dedicated to identifying, then confronting, deeply felt individual intui- 
tions and tastes against utilitarianism. His thesis is simple: 
"[u]tilitarianism often conflicts with our intuitive beliefs about what is 
morally right. "392 Baron's research identifies anti-utilitarian dispositions 
that seem to pose a powerful "stumbling blockw3" almost anytime indi- 
viduals are asked to apply consequentialist legal principles or policies. 
In Baron's view, the basic moral norm that seems to prevent indi- 
389. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 29, at 889 (describing the procedure). 
390. Jonathan Baron, Research, Books, Papers, available at http:llwww.sas.upenn.edul- 
jbaronlpprs.htrn1 (last visited Mar. 24. 2001). 
391. Jonathan Baron, Nonconsequentialist Decisions, 17 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (1994). 
392. See Jonathan Baron. Heuristics and Biases in Equity Judgments, in PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE 109, 111 (Mellers & Baron eds., 1993). 
393. See Viscusi. supra note 4. at 326. 
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viduals from embracing utilitarianism can be simply stated: "Do No 
Harm."394 Thus, Baron asked individuals whether they would (as policy 
makers) recommend widespread vaccinations, given that the vaccination 
would have both harmful and helpful effects. He found that individuals 
were reluctant to maximize the benefits to society by recommending the 
vaccine. They preferred to allow harm to occur by omission rather than 
to cause a smaller magnitude of harm by commission.3gs Similarly, 
Baron has found that individuals exhibited tastes against welfare- 
justified trade treaties when they cost real people their jobs.396 This bias 
"toward inaction"397 is similar to the status quo bias discussed above,398 
and may derive from the same intuitive moral judgment. 
Second, like Sunstein and Viscusi, Baron has found a dispiriting 
lack of willingness among members of the public to apply deterrence- 
based utilitarian decision procedures in common criminal, administra- 
tive, and tort settings. Thus, Baron found that individuals imposed 
roughly the same penalties on a given course of conduct regardless of 
whether they were told that imposing a penalty would cease harmful 
future conduct, or that it would prevent beneficial activity.3* In a re- 
lated experiment, individuals were actually given express, consequen- 
tialist arguments for deterrence before being asked to determine penal- 
ties in a hypothetical situation. Again, about half of the subjects explic- 
itly rejected consequentialist r e a s ~ n i n g . ~ ~  Individuals simply believe 
that the legal system should be focused on the moral characteristics of 
the situation here and now: "consequences of a past action . . . should 
not be judged based on its ramifications for future actions/deci~ions."~~ 
Citizens commonly reject utilitarianism by contrasting it to the just or 
fair result: "Either the company is to blame or it isn't," in the words of 
one of Baron's model jurors.402 
This anti-deterrence preference is related to another phenomenon 
that appears in Baron's work; a general distaste for coercive utilitarian- 
394. For a fascinating example of how the "Do No Harm" principle can conflict with legal 
rules, see Catherine Elliott, Murder and Necessity Following the Siamese Twins Litigation, 65 J. 
CRIM. L. 66 (2001) (describing how parents of conjoined twins refused to harm one of the pair 
by agreeing to a separation that would save the other, and examining the legal proceedings by 
which the state eventually compelled the operation). 
395. See Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Ambigu- 
ity. 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263 (1990). Ritov and Baron conclude that, "subjects are 
reluctant to vaccinate when the vaccine can cause bad outcomes, even if the outcomes of not 
vaccinating are worse." Id. at 275. 
396. See BARON, supra note 6, at 97-103. 
397. See Baron, supra note 392, at 129. 
398. See supra notes 237-245 and accompanying text. 
399. See Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions about Penalties and Compensation in the 
Context of Tort Law, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17 (1993). 
rn. BARON, supra note 6, at 123. 
401. Id. 
402. Id. 
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ism. Thus, individuals disfavor imposing taxes based on a cost-benefit 
analysis of their effect on behavior, because, such policies impose utili- 
tarianism on the publi~.""~ Subjects reject reforms like abolishing politi- 
cal advertising, eliminating medical malpractice suits, and a one hun- 
dred percent tax on gasoline, even when they know the benefits of such 
policies outweigh the costs, because to do otherwise would disadvantage 
some part of society through an imposed economic calculus.404 Baron 
warns that it is our "~ishfU1""~~ tastes for personal autonomy that might 
motivate this anti-coercive "rule of thumb."406 He discounts the right- 
ness (though not the strength) of the beliefs of those individuals who 
dislike having their "rights" trumped by "bureaucratic games. "407 
Finally, Professor Baron has sketched out some evidence for a type 
of anti-utilitarianism taste that is not simply negative: a positive taste 
for equality and deontological thinking.408 Thus, individuals wish for 
decisions about the environment to be made through deontological 
thinking, not utilitarian balan~ing.~" Baron later modified his vaccina- 
tion experiment and found that even after factoring out the status quo 
bias, individuals exhibit a positive taste for equality-at the expense of 
efficiency-when deciding between competing social programs.410 
Baron believes that these intuitions stand squarely in the path of a 
society enriched by the fruits of utilitarian thinking. He recommends a 
variety of ways "around" these tastes. These proposed solutions range 
from a rejection of cynicism about g~vernment,~" to a new kind of poli- 
tics itselC4l2 from a different kind of national press,413 to a newly accu- 
403. See id. at 54-56 (noting that resistance is in part an anti-coercive norm and in part a 
disbelief in the elasticity of behavior); see also Jonathan Baron & James Jurney. Norms Against 
Voting for Coerced Reform. 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 347 (1993). 
404. See Baron. supra note 392. at 130-31. 
405. See BARON, supra note 6. at 29-30. 
406. Id. at 142; see id. at 29, 30, 53, 142, 163. 
407. Id. at 29. 
408. Deontological moral thinking is the opposite of consequentialist thinking. Deontological 
views hold that the moral goodness or badness of an action depends, not upon the consequences 
of that action, but rather upon a direct relationship between the actor, her actions, andlor the 
immediate situation in which the action takes place. 
409. Jonathan Baron, Deontological vs. Utilitarian Values for Natural Resources, available at 
http:llwww.sas.upenn.edul-jbaronlenv.htm1 (last visited Mar. 23, 2001). 
410. Baron asked his subjects to choose between vaccinating and not vaccinating two groups 
(boys and girls), and found that even when there was no status quo effect, individuals exhibited 
significant negative reactions to decisions that would produce unequal results, even when they 
programs would maximize overall benefits in society. Baron, supra note 392, at 132-34. 
411. See BARON, supra note 6. at 185-87 (calling for individuals to trust the government to 
perform accurate cost-benefit analyses). 
412. See id. at 194-95 (calling for the government to fund politicians who present cost-benefit 
based solutions to national problems). 
413. See id. at 193-94 (calling for reporters to focus on the empirical consequences of policy 
decisions, and not the public's reaction). 
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rate and omniscient Internet.414 Indeed, should such narrow solutions 
not pan out, Baron is driven to advocate truly radical reforms to enable 
the new utilitarian era, including new kinds of ~arent ing,~" or compre- 
hensive proposals to re-educate our children so that they become aware 
of the wisdom of the welfare economic project.416 
E. The Possible Scope of Anti-Utilitarian and Other Law- 
Related Preferences 
The evidence of law-related preferences considered here leaves two 
major issues open. The first, as we have discussed repeatedly, is the 
absence of numerical values. If an individual is confronted with a legal 
policy or institution about which he holds law-related preferences or 
tastes for fairness, how do we measure what he is likely to give up in 
order to satisfjl that preference? We have endorsed the need for more 
refined investigation here, though the inability to assign dollar values to 
these preferences does not justify complacency about their effects. 
But there is a second important issue. It is plausible that many legal 
rules and institutions do not give rise to significant law-related prefer- 
ences because individuals simply do not know about them. There is 
strong empirical evidence that most individuals subject to the law do 
not actually know what it is.417 Even if individuals have a general sense 
of a legal rule, they may not understand how it is applied.418 The idea 
that non-lawyers might have real preferences about the law and its pro- 
cedures can seem counterintuitive. After all, the timely, costly ritual of 
law school exists to indoctrinate lawyers to know the law's distinctions 
in a way that the general public does not. 
414. See id. at 199-200 (arguing that Internet chat rooms have restored a "premium on facts 
and figures that concern expected consequencesn). 
415. See id. at 201 (suggesting that parents ensure that their children understand social and 
moral theory by buying them world-building computer games like Sim Earth and Sim City). 
416. See BARON, supra note 6, at 196-99 (calling for education starting in elementary school 
about utilitarian thinking); see also Baron, supra note 392, at 135 (noting that "people should be 
taught to understand the utilitarian approachn). 
417. See, e.g.. Martha Williams & Jay Hall, Knowledge of the Law in Texas: Socioeconomic 
and Ethnic Differences. 7 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 99 (1972) (discussing interviewers' findings that 
while legal knowledge varied with socio-economic status, even wealthy individuals did not know 
a large proportion of relevant private law); see also Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The 
Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. 
REV. 893 (1982) (asserting that patients did not know that their confidences had legal protec- 
tion). 
418. See ELLICKSON, supra note 276, at 48-53, 137-55 (while interested parties may under- 
stand the law in a general way, this knowledge does not incorporate the specific implications of 
rules like strict liability); cf. Pauline D. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influ- 
ences on Workers' Legal Knowledge, 1999 U .  ILL. L. REV. 447 (1999) (asserting that workers' 
misunderstanding of how the law is applied is based on their confusion of social norms and legal 
rules); see also Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 3. at 1352. 
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Paradoxically, even as Sunstein, Viscusi, and Baron are uncovering 
pronounced discontent among model tort juries with the application of 
quantitative cost-benefit procedures, federal agencies in Washington are 
blithely formulating binding regulations with the aid of cost-benefit 
analysis, as they have done for the past twenty years. This has been 
standard procedure for agencies developing major regulations since the 
issuance of a presidential Executive Order early in President Reagan's 
administrati~n.~" The Reagan order imposed a fairly rigid requirement 
that all major regulations be justified by a (textbook) cost-benefit analy- 
sis. It was supplanted during the Clinton presidency by Executive Order 
12,866, the current cost-benefit analysis order.420 Order 12,866 still 
gives cost-benefit analysis a central role in the formulation of regula- 
tory policy, though it also gives the agencies more freedom to deviate 
from textbook cost-benefit analysis by including distributional weights, 
existence values, and the like.421 Legal academics have engaged in a 
lively controversy over the policy of requiring agency cost-benefit 
analysis, but evidence of any popular outcry over the requirement is 
scarce. As far as we can tell, a large portion of the federal law-making 
apparatus has been yoked to economic norms without causing signifi- 
cant outrage to law-related preferences or other tastes for fairness. 
Yet this is not from a lack of popular interest in the legal system. 
The United States has often been described as a uniquely law-obsessed 
society: "a vast, bustling school of law," in the words of a contempo- 
rary observer.422 The law, its procedures, and even some of its techni- 
calities are constantly on display (sometimes in palpably inaccurate 
forms) in television, movies, and  book^.^" 
We are unsure how to synthesize these seemingly contradictory 
data. If forced to speculate, we would suggest that regulatory policy 
makes neither good drama nor gripping news, and that scholarly arti- 
cles debating its moral correctness are unread by all but a handful of 
Americans. Ignorance of the law may be no excuse, but it is a reality: 
utilitarians only outrage those who know about them. 
419. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). revoked by Exec. Order No. 12.866, 
3 C.F.R. 638 (1993). 
420. Exec. Order No. 12866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993). 
421. Id. President George W. Bush, in turn, has appointed personnel to the White House 
Office of Management and Budget (the office which oversees the agency regulatory process) who 
support a more restrictive implementation of the cost-benefit analysis requirement. So far the 
rigidity (or rigor) of agency cost-benefit analysis seems to be greater under Republican presi- 
dents, lower under Democratic ones. See Cindy Skrzycki, OMB Chief Vows Scrutiny ofdgencies: 
Daniels Wants Consultation With States on Major Rules, WASH. POST, May 25, 2001, at E3. 
422. MARY ANN GLENDON. A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS I N  THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 258 & n.3 (1994) (paraphrasing Lawrence 
Friedman, Law. Lawyers and Popular Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1579, 1598 (1989)). 
423. See generally id., ch. 12. 
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111. CAN A PREFERENCE-BASED LEGAL POLICY CO-EXIST WITH 
DEMOCRACY? 
We return to our guiding question: in light of improved empirical 
information, what is required for economic analysts to put the moral 
commitment to maximize well-being into practice? In this final part we 
summarize the problems that our analysis has raised and briefly discuss 
several possible responses to them. 
A. Problems Conjronting Normative Law and Economics 
1. Developing Improved Practical Techniques to Measure 
Welfare 
We argued in Part I that despite years of scholarly effort, the 
distortions caused by wealth effects still pose a serious problem for 
legal economists. The new normative analysts are careful to stress the 
ways that their moral positions differ from wealth maximization; this is 
one of the qualities that makes their moral positions potentially attrac- 
tive as bases for reform. Yet they admit that there are no consistent, 
practical methods for disentangling preference strength from wealth, 
which is necessary to maximize welfare. This perennial headache of 
welfare economics shows no sign of easing soon. 
Our discussion of citizens' preferences about the legal system in 
Part I1 suggests another reason that improved practical techniques are 
important. Analysts like Kaplow and Shavell, who are committed to 
incorporating all actual preferences into the welfare calculus, must find 
ways to assign welfare values to preferences that are difficult to assign 
market prices. At present, polls, surveys, psychological experiments 
and the like are the chief tools for investigating such preferences. Ana- 
lysts may seek to reject some of these hard-to-price preferences "on the 
merits" as morally irrelevant. They may also decide (if evidence per- 
mits) that these preferences are of negligible strength, and so can be 
ignored. But there are limits to the extent to which analysts can simply 
reject evidence of such preferences out of hand on methodological 
grounds, because of its form, and still claim to be concerned with 
maximizing welfare. The evidence of law-related preferences discussed 
in Part I1 may fall into this category. 
2. Law-Related Preferences as Components of Welfare 
If some preferences about the content and fairness of the legal sys- 
tem are significant enough to alter the outcome of economic analysis, 
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then fixing their limits will be important. The question seems wide 
open: which legal practices are strongly valued? For example, are 
popular preferences more intense with respect to the law of prostitution 
than the law of personal bankruptcy? By how much? If potentially large 
values go unmeasured, then rules that may be welfare-maximizing in 
other respects (allocatively efficient with respect to material goods, 
creating proper incentives, distributively neutral, etc.) may not in fact 
be welfare-maximizing. Or they simply may not be as big an improve- 
ment as they seem. Perhaps further research will show that law-related 
preferences have low welfare effects. But our claim, based on the evi- 
dence in Part 11, is that the answer cannot simply be derived from intui- 
tion. 
3. Law-Related Preferences as Influences on the Behavior of 
Legal Actors 
Drawing on research by Baron, Sunstein, Viscusi, and others, Part 
I1 presented direct evidence that law-related preferences sometimes 
cause ordinary people to act in ways that make legal institutions deviate 
from the goals of welfare economists. Some analysts are still inclined to 
explain these phenomena as reflecting irrational cognitive biases-and 
this may be true at times. But Sunstein, Viscusi, and Baron all concede 
that the most natural explanation of their research is not irrationality, 
but a consistent, strongly held moral reaction to economic thinking. 
People asked to apply economically grounded procedures to legal or 
policy scenarios sometimes refuse for moral or personal reasons, nulli- 
fying their instructions because they are offended by the procedures. 
Even well-educated law students appear to share this revulsion, which 
leads one to think it may affect politicians and judges as well as jurors. 
This revulsion could also affect political behavior such as voting. These 
possibilities alone make clear that law-related preferences have impor- 
tant policy ramifications. 
Again, open (and intriguing) empirical questions remain about the 
scope of law-related preferences. What is definite is that analysts have 
begun to take the problem seriously enough to speculate about re- 
sponses. 
B. Hiding the Ball: Secrecy as a Response to Law- 
Related Preferences 
I .  Possible Policies of Secrecy 
Kaplow and Shave11 concede that "there will sometimes be a sig- 
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nificant conflict between the policy that decision-makers, based on ad- 
vice from legal policy analysts, understand to be best and the policy 
that ordinary citizens think is fair."424 They recognize that there may be 
a need for judges (among other actors) to resort to the "language of 
fairness" in explaining the basis of their decisions.425 In other words: 
not only do people want certain outcomes, but people want the choices 
that created those outcomes to be non-utilitarian ones. Similarly, Sun- 
stein and his co-authors note that secrecy is a possible response to the 
data showing that individuals sharply reject the type of thinking embod- 
ied in the optimal-deterrence 
Kaplow and Shavell are somewhat coy about the form secrecy 
should take. They state that government decision-makers ought to con- 
tinue receiving "good advice" from the scholarly community. This 
good advice should consist of welfare maximizing analyses. The two 
professors are less clear about what judges should do with this advice 
when they. receive it-Fairness Versus Welfare is a piece whose in- 
tended audience is scholars, not  judge^.^" However, they suggest that 
judges might consider hiding the true bases of their decisions by em- 
ploying a code-the language of fairness-which will placate the 
The authors note that such a policy would be easy to employ be- 
cause judges could employ notions of fairness to support almost any 
policy choice.429 They go on to suggest that such coding might be un- 
necessary in any event. At present, they argue, the "masses" don't read 
court opinions, lawyers and other elites do.430 Elites, presumably, 
would be able to appreciate and approve of the complexities of welfare 
economics. 
Finally, though, Kaplow and Shavell recognize that government de- 
cision-makers are to some degree accountable to ordinary citizens, and 
they squarely confront the possibility that citizens might personally dis- 
like both the bases and the results of welfare economic decision- 
making. They respond that citizens might nevertheless accept a welfare- 
economic legal system as a matter of principle, because they might wish 
their rulers to base their decisions on methods of moral reasoning alien 
to their own. Kaplow and Shavell do not offer any empirical support for 
this prop~si t ion.~~ '  TO render it plausible, they argue that the prospect 
424. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1320. 
425. Id. at 1319-20. 
426. See Sunstein. Schkade. and Kahneman. supra note 5, at 250. 
427. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1321. 
428. See id. at 1319. 
429. Id. 
430. See id. at 1319 n.869. 
431. See id. at 1322-23. 
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of using welfare economics to reshape the legal system does not raise 
any special moral or political issues. Instead, it is an example of a quite 
general tendency. It is common in many walks of life, the two authors 
reason, for experts' advice to suggest different results than the beliefs 
of ordinary And there is usually little popular discontent 
about such divergences; after all, that is what experts are for. Why, 
then, should a legal system whose substance and procedures are based 
on expert economic advice be regarded any differently? 
This argument is confused. The examples of specialized advice that 
Kaplow and Shavell mention all have to do with the knowledge pos- 
sessed by technical experts (one of their examples is safety engineers). 
Individuals may indeed be relatively comfortable surrendering their 
judgment on technical issues to certified experts, but it is not at all 
clear that most people believe that credentialed professionals are enti- 
tled to their deference in moral matters-and the type of expert advice 
Kaplow and Shavell propose to give is moral. It is reasonable to assume 
that popular disagreement with experts about the proper moral basis of 
the legal system will be of a different kind, and far more strongly held, 
than disagreement with experts about the fine points of hydroelectric 
turbine design. And to the extent that such disagreements are strongly 
held, Kaplow and Shavell must take them into account, both as compo- 
nents of welfare and as behavioral influences on legal actors.433 
432. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1323. 
433. The philosopher Bernard Williams has observed that many utilitarian ethical theories 
imply a division between "a class of theorists who can responsibly handle the utilitarian justifica- 
tion of non-utilitarian dispositions, the other a class who unreflectively deploy[s] those disposi- 
tions." BERNARD WILLIAMS,  ETHICS A N D  THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 108 (1985). AS Williams 
notes, the great utilitarian theorist Henry Sidgwick confronted such a problem near the end of the 
nineteenth century in his chief philosophical work, The Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick feared that. 
while utilitarianism was true, widespread dissemination of that truth might not promote human 
welfare. In light of utilitarianism, that implied that disseminating it would be morally wrong. 
Attempting to inculcate utilitarian attitudes in normal citizens might "do more harm by weaken- 
ing current morality than good by improving its quality." HENRY SIDGWICK, T H E  METHODS O F  
ETHICS 489-90 (7th ed. 1907) (1874); see also BERNARD WILLIAMS. ETHICS A N D  THE LIMITS OF 
PHILOSOPHY 109 (1985). 
Sidgwick therefore inclined to the view that utilitarian theorists should carefully limit the 
publicity that they gave to their ethical views. Similarly, today improved empirical information 
seems to be driving Kaplow and Shavell to consider limiting the number of citizens who learn 
that utilitarian norms are at work in the legal system. Sidgwick mused: 
[O]n Utilitarian principles, it may be right to do and privately recommend, under 
certain circumstances, what it would not be right to advocate openly; it may be 
right to teach openly to one set of persons what it would be wrong to teach to oth- 
ers; it may be conceivably right to do, if it can be done with comparative secrecy, 
what it would be wrong to do in the face of the world. 
Id. at 109. 
20021 Law and Economics 413 
2. Problems with Secrecy 
We foresee three objections to a legal regime bent on hiding the de- 
cision-making technique from the people. First, it is possible that the 
people will uncover the man behind the curtain. To the extent that Kap- 
low and Shave11 propose that a broad class of actors hides its real moti- 
vations (the judges), while a smaller class of actors actively explores 
the real principles of decision (scholars), it is likely that someone, 
sometime, will let the cat out of the bag. Indeed, complete secrecy is 
unrealistic. Rather, welfare economists would have to hope that a re- 
gime of mixed secrecy will suffice, whereby the real norms of decision 
are translated into "fairness" terms, but the public is generally aware 
that more complicated economic analyses underlie these decisions. 
However, it is unclear that even a mixed secrecy regime could cohere 
for long. For example, scholars hostile to the practical or moral foun- 
dations of the welfare project might attempt to write descriptive pieces 
in mainstream publications, seizing on particularly salient examples that 
pit welfare solutions against fairness norms.434 
Second, hiding the moral bases of legal policies from the people af- 
fected by them may be morally objectionable in itself. Analysts who 
were previously inclined to exclude some preferences from the concept 
of well-being on ethical grounds may feel uneasy about supporting a 
system that is accepted, and promotes well-being, only because its na- 
ture is not generally known. Thus, as Adler and Posner observe, it is 
philosophically plausible to argue that preferences premised on a seri- 
ously mistaken understanding of reality should not be included in the 
concept of well-being. They give the example of a researcher who car- 
ries on a happy and productive scientific career, and regards his past 
professional activity with great satisfaction.435 Unbeknownst to the re- 
searcher, his government has clandestinely funneled his scientific work 
into "a secret weapons program" that would horrify him if he knew 
about it.436 In such a case, it might be wrong to view the researcher's 
career as having improved his well-being, even though he, in his igno- 
rance, remains fully satisfied. Analogously, if a reformed legal system 
brought great tangible benefits to citizens, but was secretly based on 
procedures and ideas of which the citizens would seriously disapprove 
(if only they knew), it may be difficult to say that the system is norma- 
tively desirable. 
In addition, special moral and ethical problems may arise if academ- 
434. We find this project tempting. 
435. Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 203. 
436. Id. The premise that the researcher would strongly disapprove of the project is implicit 
in Adler and Posner's presentation. 
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ics become involved in policies that involve deliberate concealment of 
the norms underlying the legal system. The social norms of openness 
and transparency are important characteristics of academic culture, and 
we are skeptical that academics would be open to such a significant 
change in that culture. 
C. Giving the Ball to Bureaucrats: Regulatory Responses to Anti- 
Utilitarian Preferences 
A second solution to the problem of anti-utilitarianism has been ad- 
verted to several times in the text above: remove power from populist 
decision-makers. Professors Baron, Viscusi, and Sunstein are all, to 
some degree, tempted to transfer the authority to implement legal poli- 
cies from democratic common law institutions to government bureauc- 
racies. 
Sunstein is the most explicit regulator of the three scholars. His 
failure to convince University of Chicago law students to maximize 
what he saw as social welfare has left him shaken. In his article's con- 
clusion, Sunstein argues that simply hiding decision-making norms 
from the populace, as Kaplow and Shave11 appear to endorse, will be 
insufficient. A better solution would be to remove power to unelected 
(and insulated) bureaucrats, who will maximize welfare in the face of 
contrary individual  preference^.^^' 
Viscusi similarly suggests a vast reduction in the power of judges 
and juries to regulate corporate decisions on product and environmental 
safety.438 Corporations, he seems to be saying, will either self-regulate 
(through the cost-benefit mechanism) or be subject to partial regulation 
by the government (possibly to keep these cost-benefit analyses hon- 
es t) . 439 
The radical and paternalistic qualities of these proposals are indirect 
evidence of the strength of the anti-utilitarian preference among the 
general public. However, we will sound a note of doubt about the prac- 
ticality of the "regulatory" solution of Sunstein, Viscusi, and Baron. 
First, as a matter of politics, it is a complicated question whether the 
majority will acquiesce to being deprived of the ability to make the hard 
choices about political goods. (We decline to address that question 
here.) But even to the extent that "ordinary individuals" remain unin- 
437. Id.; see also Jolls et al., supra note 139, at 48-49 (suggesting that a stronger bureauc- 
racy might be better than a "populist governmentn at avoiding the bad consequences of what they 
see as irrational choices, and concluding that the question of whether this is a wise policy should 
be answered empirically, and not morally or philosophically). 
438. Viscusi, The Social Cost of Punitive Damages against Corporations in Environmental 
and Safety Torts. supra note 303, at 335-36. 
439. Id. 
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formed about bureaucratic decisions, individuals adversely affected by 
bureaucratic decisions will constantly push to return them to the public 
sphere, where their influence might be better heard.440 But even if this 
were not so, and we could somehow tie ourselves to the mast of a 
purely regulatory state, we believe that bureaucrats are people too. In- 
deed, many of them may have once been Professor Sunstein's law stu- 
dents, or Professor Baron's anti-utilitarian undergraduates. The point is 
that there is little evidence, as Professor Sunstein himself admits, that 
bureaucrats overseeing tort or environmental disputes with serious fair- 
ness dimensions will do what efficiency requires when it conflicts with 
their own moral  belief^.^' It is more likely that pushing power from the 
legal system to the government will simply discount the preferences of 
the majority of the people while substituting the preferences of the few, 
and it may substitute the biases of elites for the choices of a broader 
cross-section of the nation. 
D. See Spot Run, See Spot Jump, See Spot PerjGorm the Welfare 
Calculus: Re-Education as a Response to 
Anti-Utilitarian Preferences 
A third possible solution to the problem of anti-utilitarianism is re- 
education. People's preferences can sometimes be changed by being 
taught to prefer something else. One after the other, many of the au- 
thors discussed in this Article have broached the idea that the govern- 
ment should teach citizens enough about utilitarianism to make conse- 
quentialist legal decision-making palatable.442 Baron considers this idea 
in the most detail, so we briefly present his ideas as an example of what 
such a re-education program might look like. 
Baron argues that all citizens should be taught that their sincerely 
held moral intuitions will sometimes run contrary to proper, utilitarian, 
social  practice^.^^ In order to teach citizens to distrust their moral in- 
tuitions, Baron argues for a multi-level, multi-year commitment. On the 
home front, we have already mentioned Baron's commitment to world 
simulating computer games as the engine of social change.444 In junior 
high school, Baron believes students should be taught about consequen- 
tialism, even though he acknowledges that it will "conflict with intui- 
~ --- 
440. Professor Sunstein and his co-authors argue, however, that bureaucrats are more likely 
to be protected from such popular pressures than judges and legislators. See Jolls et al., supra 
note 139. at 48. 
441. Id. 
442. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1323 n.877; see also Sunstein, supra note 5, at 
250; BARON. supra note 6. at 196. 
443. BARON, supra note 6, at 196. 
444. See id. at 201. 
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tions that students and their parents have."445 In high school, he argues 
all students should be taught a course in "social theory. "446 This course 
ought to be frankly ideological, teaching students "the basic ideas of the 
free market and why it leads to efficient outcomes,"447 asking students 
to perform "simplified cost-benefit analysis"448 of regulations, and 
teaching them about the biases that might pervert their own decision 
making. As for college students, Baron finds it "disturbing" that many 
have not been exposed to deterrence based theories of criminal punish- 
ment, and might require mandatory courses in welfare economic con- 
cepts for all students.449 
Baron makes clear that he believes students (and the citizenry) 
should understand that economics is not truly political. He appears to 
believe that if citizens "walk through" basic economic problems, they 
will become convinced that the validity of more complicated welfare 
economic policy proposals does not simply rest on value  judgment^.^" 
This would, presumably, make welfare analyses less vulnerable to po- 
litical protest by opponents of their normative proposals; it would in- 
oculate welfare economics against charges of moral sectarianism. 
We refrain from passing judgment here on the morality of such so- 
cial techniques. However, we imagine several significant practical hur- 
dles to re-education. These problems fall loosely within the following 
three categories: lack of resources, secrecy, and unintended conse- 
quences. 
First, it is likely that at least some of these proposals would require 
significantly increasing the involvement of the federal government in 
the public education of its young citizens. Absent federal involvement, 
there would be no way to be sure that each state was teaching its citi- 
zenry utilitarian thinking at the same rate, a consequence of federal- 
ism/localized-education that would create huge complexities in welfare 
analyses of the effects of legal rules.451 Moreover, the federal education 
budget does not now, as a general matter, force states to teach specific 
subjects. Changing the structure of the educational system to create a 
nationally uniform subject matter would clearly entail serious constitu- 
445. Id. at 197. 
446. Although he argues that such a course might be available "at first" on an elective only 
basis. Id. at 196. 
447. Id. at 197. 
448. BARON, supra note 6, at 19G. 
449. Id. 
450. See id. at 197. 
451. For example, under local educational control residents of Massachusetts might learn 
consequentialist decision-making; residents of Alabama might not. In that case, perhaps the 
ability to implement legal policies and rules created through welfare economic analysis would 
have to vary state by state, creating the need for inefficient jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction tailoring. 
Who knows? 
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tional and political entanglements, and scholars have not yet even begun 
to consider how these issues would work out. 
Even assuming that academics could successfully create a uniform 
utilitarian education program, such a program would fall victim to the 
same problems as policies of secrecy discussed above. If individuals 
knew that their children were being educated in utilitarian decision- 
making, and then found out that the program hoped to create a society 
of thinkers comfortable with utilitarianism, popular outrage might be 
considerable. Parents, after all, would not yet have been re-educated to 
appreciate consequentialism, and might therefore be offended by the 
Big-Brother-like, traditional-morality-destroying program. This belief, 
however irrational, could create a serious political obstacle. 
Third, the re-education program, if it worked, might destroy the al- 
truistic and social norms that bind society together. Professors Kaplow 
and Shavell acknowledge that many internalized social norms push in- 
dividuals to behave in society's interest rather than their If peo- 
ple were consistently consequentialist, "they might act in their self- 
interest," which would not maximize overall welfare.453 It is for this 
reason they argue for a difference between the principles that guide 
legal policy analysts and the principles that guide ordinary individuals 
in their lives.454 
This concern is not entirely fanciful. There is evidence that study- 
ing economics-whose modes of reasoning are relentlessly consequen- 
tialist-makes a person less altruistic, less involved in one's commu- 
nity, and more politically conservative.455 Some studies report that 
economists are more likely than other educated individuals to give noth- 
ing to charity over the course of a year.456 Economists are also more 
likely, despite their knowledge of game theory, to be "defectors" (that 
is, to act self-interestedly) in iterations of the famous "prisoner's di- 
lemma. "457 Most disturbingly, education in economics appears to retard 
the onset of a general tendency toward altruism that normally increases 
with age, experience, and maturity.458 
452. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 1305. 
453. Id. 
454. See id. at 1306 n.836. 
455. See, e.g., Robert H. Frank et al., Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?, J .  
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1993, at 159 [hereinafter Inhibit Cooperarion]; see also Robert H. Frank 
et al., Do Economisrs Make Bad Citizens?, J .  ECON. PERSP., Winter 1996, at 187. Professors 
Kaplow and Shavell argue that the data on this issue is mixed. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 
3. at 1369 n.993 (citing sources). However. the very fact that there is some data tending to sup- 
port their intuition that consequentialism is at odds with the norms that hold society together 
should make them wary about implementing a re-education campaign on any broad basis. 
456. See Inhibit Cooperation. supra note 455, at 162. 
457. See id. at 163-65. 
458. See id. at 168 (showing a gap in defection rates between economics majors and non- 
majors tends to widen as students move toward graduation). 
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Under present conditions, we suspect that a program of consequen- 
tialist re-education that was ambitious enough to make a difference 
would be self-defeating, disastrous, or otherwise seriously impractical. 
E. Limiting the Scope of Law and Economics Based Reform 
Less fanciful responses to these problems are available. In Part 11, 
the most pointed empirical evidence of law-related preferences con- 
cerned two aspects of common-law adjudication: procedural justice 
(1I.B) and the assessment of punitive damages in tort (1I.D). Intuitively, 
these fields form part of the "moral heartland" of the legal system. 
They are domains where the influence of fairness and moral values on 
the legal system is likely to be at a zenith. (The criminal law of malum 
in se offenses is another such domain.) To be sure, some of the evi- 
dence in Part 1I.C does deal with other fields of law, and the evidence 
we have assembled may fall in the "moral heartland" simply because 
that is where researchers have chosen to direct their attentions. Never- 
theless, our analysis suggests that analysts must be especially cautious 
in devising policies that will extend welfare economic norms into these 
common-law fields. 
Confirming this view, we find that those economic analysts who 
seek to reform the common-law fields, such as Kaplow, Shavell, Sun- 
stein, and Viscusi, also propose the most dramatic responses to law- 
related preferences, such as secrecy and increased bureaucratic control. 
By contrast, one senses that there is less public awareness, hence less 
public concern, with domains such as administrative agency regulation. 
No one doubts that administrative regulations, especially on the federal 
level, can have major welfare effects. But the technicality and intricacy 
of most matters of agency concern do not seem to arouse the same pas- 
sion in the public at large as the issues presented in tort disputes, 
criminal cases, and the like.459 Of course, these hunches need to be con- 
firmed by empirical research. Still, it may be a sensible strategy for 
legal economists to limit their attention to areas such as administrative 
regulation, which have important effects on well-being, yet where tastes 
for fairness and law-related preferences are likely to play a smaller 
role. 
Professors Adler and Posner's normative position gains considera- 
bly in credibility and appeal because it is expressly limited in applica- 
459. This is not always the case. Environmental regulatory disputes, in particular. can raise 
strong passions. More psychological pitfalls may confront a typical EPA economic analyst who 
seeks to gauge the effects of a regulation on well-being than would confront a typical FTC eco- 
nomic analyst in the same position. 
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tion to the domain of cost-benefit analysis by regulatory agencies.460 
Academics have recently paid intense attention to the specific founda- 
tions of agency cost-benefit analysis.46' This may simply reflect the fact 
that agency rulemaking is, at present, the locus in the real-world legal 
system. But it may also reflect a more or less conscious intuition that 
the agency regulation field is less likely to present the minefield of in- 
dividual preferences that may complicate the analysis of common-law 
fields. 
Adler and Posner make another important concession. They stipu- 
late that because of the problem of wealth effects, available practical 
techniques may be inadequate to deal with situations where the affected 
individuals differ widely in This, too, is an important conces- 
sion that increases the plausibility of Adler and Posner's overall norma- 
tive position. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
What is the answer to our title question? The recent scholarship dis- 
cussed in this Article represents an important step toward developing a 
satisfactory normative position in law and economics. Of course, schol- 
ars who outright reject the sort of broadly consequentialist moral prin- 
ciples defended by Kaplow and Shavell, Adler and Posner, and Chang 
will dismiss our title question with a curt "no." We appreciate that 
forceful criticisms of consequentialist morality exist. We have, how- 
ever, chosen to place such direct philosophical criticism mostly outside 
the scope of this Article. 
The connection between principle and practice in law and econom- 
ics is still not close enough. One obstacle is wealth effects and interper- 
sonal utility comparisons in general. They pose an unsolved problem. 
The psychological data that we analyzed in the previous two parts 
suggest that a consistent, preference-based reform of the legal system 
faces practical problems. The welfare effects of any given change in 
legal rules will be complicated and unpredictable. Furthermore, since 
these effects will not often involve goods with a market price, it will be 
hard for economists to measure their magnitudes. There is a real need 
to develop improved standards for incorporating poll, survey, and other 
experimental data in the welfare calculus. 
Moreover, law-related preferences seriously complicate the issue of 
460. In this Article we have nevertheless considered the applicability of Adler and Posner's 
improved version of cost-benefit analysis to common-law fields. Adler and Posner's decision to 
confine their prescriptions to the agency regulation field is not logically required by the rest of 
their position. 
461. See generally Implementing Cost-Benefir, supra note 15. 
462. See Rethinking Cost-Benefit, supra note 15, at 246. 
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designing appropriate institutions to put welfare economic principles 
into practice. Scholars who have addressed this issue find themselves 
tempted into paternalism. For example, in order to implement a princi- 
pled commitment to optimal deterrence, analysts recommend removing 
the jury's age-old power to punish bad actors with punitive damages. 
Others hope to reduce citizens' role in formulating legal policy by cre- 
ating two sets of legal discourse: one for public consumption, and one 
for legal elites. Such proposals are practically problematic, because of 
the difficulty of enacting them. And they are also morally troubling. 
In the end, the answer to our title question depends in large part on 
the results of future empirical research, and on the scope of legal 
economists' ambitions. Even giving legal economists the best data that 
they could hope for, we suspect that their proper, moral, role will be 
limited to the most arcane corners of our regulatory state. Can law and 
economics be both practical and principled? With respect to the com- 
mon law and its moral heartland, we think not. 
